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Abstract
This thesis examines fiscal policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
and the effects of market (de)regulation. Chapter 1 summarizes the thesis.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate different aspects of fiscal policy in a DSGE model with
endogenous producer entry and labour market frictions. Chapters 2 studies optimum product
diversity and optimal fiscal policy. I find that marginal cost pricing is optimal when market
regulation is absent. However, in the presence of regulation, there are efficiency trade-offs from
using fiscal instruments to eliminate one or more distortions which exist in the competitive
equilibrium.
Chapter 3 investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks in economies with high
and low regulation, respectively. I find that an expansion in government spending reduces
product creation and is recessionary. In addition, a positive shock to labour and capital
income tax rates, respectively, also generates recessionary effects due to the dynamics of entry,
investment and labour market conditions.
Chapter 4 examines the macroeconomic and welfare effects of market deregulation in the
context of optimized unemployment benefits. Results show that benefit optimization does not
generate significant overall welfare gains following deregulation. However, following labour
market deregulation, an optimized path of unemployment benefits generates positive short run
welfare in contrast to the non-optimized status quo.
Chapter 5 empirically examines the macroeconomic effects of deregulation and interactions
between regulation and reform. Results show that reducing entry barriers and employment
protection, respectively, negatively affects consumption in the short run. Evidence also suggests
that product market deregulation leads to a larger rise in unemployment in the short run when
unemployment benefits are high.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent developments in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, made to ac-
count for macroeconomic stylized facts, have seen the introduction of important features into
the standard real business cycle (RBC) model. This richer structure of DSGE models has in-
creased our understanding of key interactions within the economy and has provided a superior
framework to study a range of macroeconomic policy questions.
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis deal with selected topics in fiscal policy in the context of
a DSGE model which incorporates endogenous producer entry and labour market frictions,
with endogenous job creation and job destruction, into the standard RBC model. Chapter 4
also adopts this framework to study the macroeconomic effects of market reforms under an
optimized unemployment benefit policy. Finally, inspired by the theoretical results, Chapter 5
empirically assesses the macroeconomic effects of deregulation and interactions between reform
and regulation.
Bilbiie et al. (2012), hereafter BGM, develop a DSGE model which features endogenous
producer entry and product variety. The authors find that the model matches key empirical
moments at least as well as the traditional RBC model. The performance of the model, relative
to the baseline model without capital and the standard RBC model, is further enhanced by
the introduction of capital investment. The authors show that, under translog preferences,
which imply that the elasticity of substitution across goods increases with the number of
goods on the market, and endogenous product creation, the model can simultaneously generate
countercyclical markups and procyclical profits.
Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), hereafter CF, augment the BGM model with labour market
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frictions, endogenous job creation and job destruction. In a baseline model with goods and
labour market regulation, the authors show that their model matches the observed volatility
of key macroeconomic and labour market variables well, and is able to generate a negative
Beveridge curve. In addition, the model is able to jointly reproduces stylized facts related to
firm entry, profits and markups, as in BGM.
Bilbiie et al. (2008) examine the efficiency properties of the BGM model and optimal
fiscal policy in this framework. The authors show that the optimal degree of product variety is
not achieved in the competitive equilibrium under translog preferences. This results from two
distortions. The first, which is a dynamic distortion, is associated with the non-synchronization
of markups across time. This distortion arises because firm entry creates a divergence between
markups across periods which distorts the intertemporal allocation of resources. The second,
the ‘misalignment distortion’, is a static distortion which occurs due to a divergence between
a new entrant’s profit rate and the benefit to consumers from additional product variety. This
distortion leads to socially inefficient entry in a given period.
As in BGM, the misalignment distortion creates inefficiency in product creation in the CF
framework. However, in contrast to BGM, firm monopoly power also generates distortions,
along margins which are absent in the baseline BGM model. Firm monopoly power distorts
capital accumulation, job creation and job destruction. In addition, market regulation also
generates distortions. Three dimensions of market regulation are considered by the authors,
including, barriers to entry, firing costs, and unemployment benefits, respectively. Barriers
to entry distort product creation by increasing the sunk costs associated with market entry
beyond that which obtains in the planner equilibrium. Firing costs create distortions along the
job creation and job destruction margins, respectively. Unemployment benefits also distort job
destruction by raising the worker’s outside option. Firing costs and entry barriers create an
additional inefficiency wedge in the resource constraint for consumption output by diverting
resources away from other uses. These distortions generate five inefficiency wedges in the
decentralized CF equilibrium.
Chapter 2 “Monopoly power and regulation: distortions and efficiency” examines the fis-
cal polices which generate optimum product variety in two versions of the CF model. It also
investigates optimal fiscal policy in a version of the CF model without regulation. Finally, it
examines the effect of market regulation in the decentralized CF equilibrium on the ability
of fiscal policy to raise overall efficiency. Under the first perspective considered, the ‘flexible
13
perspective’, market regulation is not a feature of the economy. Therefore, under this per-
spective, I focus on how taxes should be set to eliminate non-regulation related distortions,
thereby restoring efficiency in the competitive equilibrium. I also investigate the taxation
schemes which restore efficiency in product creation, as in Bilbiie et al. (2008). Under the
second model variant, the ‘rigid perspective’, which corresponds to the baseline CF model,
market regulation is present. Under this perspective, I study the implications of regulation
for the ability of fiscal policy instruments to eliminate distortions and raise efficiency in the
decentralized equilibrium.
I find that marginal cost pricing restores overall efficiency under the flexible perspective
of the CF economy, as in BGM. Also, there are taxation schemes under all policies for which
efficiency in product creation can be restored. However, the optimality of marginal cost pricing
does not extend to the rigid perspective. I show in a numerical exercise that under this
perspective, there is no policy which is able to lower all inefficiency wedges. This indicates
that when regulation is present in the economy, there may be efficiency trade-offs which result
from implementing fiscal policies which would restore efficiency in the absence of regulation.
Chapter 3 “Fiscal Policy Shocks: endogenous entry and labour market frictions” investi-
gates the effects of fiscal policy shocks in the CF framework. The literature on the effects of
government spending shocks is rather unsettled with regards to the effect of an expansion in
government spending on consumption and investment. In addition, little is known about the
implications of labour market frictions for the propagation of fiscal shocks. Realistic aspects of
fiscal policy are incorporated into the CF model to investigate the extent to which the presence
of labour market frictions matter for aggregate outcomes following fiscal shocks in economies
with low and high regulation, respectively. Three fiscal policy shocks are considered, namely:
i) a shock to government consumption; ii) a capital income tax shock; iii) a labour income tax
shock.
Results show that private consumption reacts negatively following a positive shock to gov-
ernment spending which is financed by lump sum taxes. In addition, investment in capital and
new products also falls. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the standard RBC
model. The results show that a rise in government spending can lead to a persistent decline in
wages due to entry and capital investment dynamics. Output also shows a persistent decline,
in contrast to standard RBC theory. Results also show that positive shocks to the capital and
labour income tax rates are also recessionary due to the dynamics of entry, investment and
14
labour market conditions.
Chapter 4 “Optimized Unemployment Benefits and Market Deregulation” examines wel-
fare and transitional adjustment following deregulation with optimized unemployment benefits.
CF investigate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of lowering sunk entry costs and firing
costs, respectively, in a calibrated model of the Euro Area. Following deregulation, the au-
thors assume that unemployment benefits are immediately changed to their long run levels.
In contrast, this chapter investigates whether there is scope for welfare improvements from
optimizing the path of unemployment benefits and/or its final equilibrium value.
In order to investigate the relative importance of the transition phases and final equilibria,
respectively, for overall welfare, three scenarios under which optimization can occur following
deregulation are considered. In the first scenario, unemployment benefits are immediately
changed to their optimized steady-state level following deregulation, similar to CF (however,
here the final equilibrium is optimized). In the second scenario, unemployment benefits are
optimized as the economy transitions to its new equilibrium, but not in the new equilibrium
itself. In the final scenario, unemployment benefits are optimized both in transition and in the
final steady state.
The key policy change introduced in this chapter is a novel unemployment benefit rule
which determines the path of unemployment benefits in transition. Optimization of unem-
ployment benefits in transition involves implementing an unemployment benefit rule in which
parameter values are chosen to maximize the overall welfare effect of deregulation. Two vari-
ants of the benefit rule are considered. In the first variant of the rule, the unemployment
benefit level depends solely on the pre- and post-deregulation benefit levels. The second vari-
ant, on the other hand, includes an additional term which responds to GDP growth. From
this version of the rule, we can examine the welfare implications of relating the benefit path
to changes in economic conditions and consider whether unemployment benefits should vary
following deregulation.
The results show that product market deregulation always leads to short run welfare
losses irrespective of the dynamics of unemployment benefits due to the negative adjustment
of consumption in the short run. Following both product and labour market deregulation,
respectively, overall welfare is highest when optimization occurs in transition, under the second
variant of the benefit rule. However, the welfare gains are relatively small. The short run
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welfare effects of lowering firing costs however become positive when the unemployment benefit
path is optimized which could lower political aversion to its implementation.
Chapter 5 “The macroeconomic effects of deregulation: Evidence from panel VAR” em-
pirically examines the macroeconomic effects of deregulation and explores interactions using a
panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Most studies in the literature focus on labour market
outcomes following deregulation. Empirical studies on the effect of market deregulation, par-
ticularly those examining interactions between regulation policies, have largely focused on the
effect of regulation/deregulation on labour market variables. Fiori et al. (2008), for example,
examine the effect of market regulation on unemployment in a panel fixed effects model using
data on OECD countries. The authors find that more stringent product and labour market
regulation lower employment. Griffith et al. (2007) find supporting evidence for the effect of
product market deregulation on unemployment.
Fewer studies, with the exception of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Griffith and Harrison
(2004), and Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) have considered the effect of market deregulation on
aggregate outcomes. Griffith and Harrison (2004) in a panel of 12 European Union countries
over the 1980s and 1990s find that labour market reform lowers the average level of economic
rents and is associated with higher employment and investment. Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003), using panel regression methods, show that entry liberalization in the service sector
has a statistically significant positive effect on economy-wide total factor productivity growth.
A few studies, such as, Bassanini and Cingano (2017) and Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), have
examined the short run effects of deregulation. These studies find that increasing competition
and easing employment protection can entail sizeable short run employment losses.
CF show, using their DSGE model, that a reduction in barriers to entry and firing restric-
tions, respectively, leads to declines in market consumption and capital investment due to the
diversion of resources towards the creation of new products, in addition to, the combination of
instantaneous job destruction and slow job creation. In this chapter, I empirically investigate
the macroeconomic effects of individual market deregulation with a focus on private consump-
tion. Secondly, I consider whether the level of labour market regulation (firing restrictions
and unemployment benefits, respectively) has implications for the macroeconomic effects of
deregulation along another dimension.
The results show that a reduction in barriers to entry has a negative effect on consump-
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tion in the short run. I find similar results for a reduction in the stringency of employment
protection. These results support the theoretical prediction of the CF model. The results
also show that the impact of product market deregulation on consumption in the short run is
independent of the benefit level. This is supported by findings from Chapter 4 which compare
transition dynamics across different levels of unemployment benefits following product market
deregulation. The results also indicate that product market deregulation leads to a larger rise
in short run unemployment in a high replacement rate setting, as well as when employment
protection is high.
In the course of this thesis, I investigate the implications of fiscal policy for welfare and
macroeconomic outcomes in a DSGE framework which captures important aspects of prod-
uct and labour markets. I also examine different aspects of (de)regulation, empirically and
theoretically. In particular, I investigate the extent to which the macroeconomic and welfare
effects of deregulation depend on unemployment benefit policy. I also empirically examine
interactions between reform and regulation, finding evidence which support the theoretical
results. A better understanding of the effects of government policies is crucially important as
it can improve policy decisions and help with the design of policy. I hope this thesis adds to
current knowledge on the aspects of fiscal policy examined and on the macroeconomic effects
of (de)regulation.
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Chapter 2
Monopoly power and regulation:
Distortions and efficiency
2.1 Introduction
How should taxes be set to restore efficiency in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model characterized by endogenous firm entry, labour market frictions, and endoge-
nous job creation and destruction? In addition, which fiscal instruments can meet this objec-
tive? Bilbiie et al. (2008) examine optimal (first-best) fiscal policies in the framework developed
by Bilbiie et al. (2012), hereafter BGM, which features monopolistic competition and endoge-
nous firm entry. Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), here after CF, extend the BGM framework to
incorporate labour market frictions, in addition to, endogenous job creation and job destruc-
tion, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Den Haan et al. (2000).
CF show that the BGM model extended to account for these additional features of the
labour market matches the observed volatility of key macroeconomic variables well and jointly
reproduces stylized facts related to firm entry, profits and markups. This chapter investigates
optimal fiscal policy and the taxation schemes which restore optimum product variety in a
variant of the CF framework which abstracts from market regulation. This “flexible economy”
is defined as in CF but with the exclusion of goods and labour market regulation. A “rigid
economy” is also examined. In this economy, three dimensions of regulation, namely barriers to
entry, firing restrictions and unemployment benefits, respectively, are present as in the baseline
CF model. The effect of a range of fiscal instruments on the inefficiency wedges present under
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both scenarios are also considered.
Two distortions are present in the BGM model as identified by Bilbiie et al. (2008). The
first, which is a dynamic distortion, results from the non-synchronization of markups across
time. This distortion arises because firm entry creates a divergence between markups across
periods which distorts the intertemporal allocation of resources. The second, the ‘misalignment
distortion’ is a static distortion which leads to socially inefficient entry in a given period. This
distortion occurs due to a divergence between an entrant’s profit incentive to produce an
additional variety and the benefit to consumers from that additional variety.
The flexible CF model also features two sources of distortions which result in four inef-
ficiency wedges. In addition to the misalignment distortion, CF show that monopoly power
creates inefficiency along the job creation and job destruction margins, respectively, in addition
to, sub-optimal capital investment. Therefore, in contrast to BGM, monopoly power consti-
tutes a distortion under this perspective. Under the rigid perspective, entry barriers distort
product creation. Firing costs, on the other hand, create distortions along the job creation and
job destruction margins, respectively. Finally, unemployment benefits distort job destruction
by raising the worker’s outside option. In addition to the four margins of adjustment affected
by distortions under the flexible perspective, firing costs and entry barriers, respectively, affect
the resource constraint for consumption output by diverting resources away from other uses.
This results in the additional consumption output inefficiency wedge.
Four fiscal instruments are considered. These include i) an entry tax/subsidy or (de)regulation
policy; ii) a sales subsidy; iii) a dividend tax; and iv) marginal cost pricing. i), ii) and iv) are
BGM-optimal policies. That is, these instruments are shown in Bilbiie et al. (2008) to restore
efficiency in product creation. Given that the product creation/misalignment distortion in
the flexible economy is a subset of that in BGM, it is expected that these policies can also
implement optimum product variety. I determine the taxation schemes which restore optimum
product variety under the flexible perspective. I also investigate the effect of these policies on
the inefficiency wedges present in the rigid economy.
This chapter contributes to the literature on optimal taxation and optimum product variety
in general equilibrium macroeconomic models with endogenous entry. Studies have examined
optimal fiscal policy in the BGM framework and in variants of the model. Chugh and Ghironi
(2011) examine Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy in the BGM framework. Lewis and Winkler
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(2015) investigate optimum product diversity and optimal fiscal policy in the first and second-
best environments under alternative demand structures in a static variant of the BGM setup.
Colciago (2016), on the other hand, examine Ramsey-optimal policy in an oligopolistic setting
but in a dynamic framework in contrast to Lewis and Winkler (2015).
I find that marginal cost pricing is able to restore efficiency in the flexible CF equilibrium,
as in BGM. However, in contrast to BGM where marginal cost pricing is not compulsory, this
policy is necessary under the flexible perspective due to the distortion created by monopoly
power. Also, there are taxation schemes under all policies considered for which efficiency
in product creation can be restored. I show in a numerical exercise that under the rigid
perspective, there is no policy which is able to lower all inefficiency wedges. The product
creation wedge rises with all policies due to the distortion from entry barriers. The chapter
is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model. The inefficiency wedges are reviewed
in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 investigates the effect of a range of taxation schemes on efficiency
in the decentralized equilibrium under the flexible perspective. Section 2.5 examines taxation
schemes under the rigid perspective. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
This section details the CF model framework. Prices and contracts are written in nominal
terms. Prices are fully flexible. Money acts as a convenient unit of account and serves no other
role in the economy. The framework follows Woodford (2003) in assuming a cashless economy.
2.2.1 Household preferences
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households, each composed of a [0,1] con-
tinuum of members. The measure of workers who work within the household is not determined
by the household but by a labour market matching process. The model assumes full consump-
tion insurance, so that consumption is the same for employed and unemployed members of the
household. Each unemployed worker produces an amount hp of home production. Following
Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), family members insure each other against variation in
labour income that result from changes in employment status so that no expost-heterogeneity
exists across individuals within the household. The representative household maximizes the
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expected intertemporal utility function:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γt
(1− γ)
]
(2.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and Ct represents the consumption of market and
home produced goods. The consumption of market goods, Ct
M consists of a variety of goods
defined over a continuum Ω. At any point in time, a subset of goods, Ωt ∈ Ω is available.
The aggregator Ct
M takes a translog form as proposed by Feenstra (2003). As a result, the
elasticity of substitution across varieties is a function of the number of goods available. Translog
preferences are represented by the unit expenditure function which is equal to the price index.
The unit expenditure function of a basket of goods Ct
M is given by:
ln(Pt) =
1
2σ
(
1
Nt
− 1
N˜
)+
1
Nt
∫
ω∈Ωt
ln(pωt)dω+
σ
2Nt
∫
ω∈Ωt
∫
ω′∈Ωt
ln(pωt)(ln(pωt)−ln
(
pω′ t
)
)dωdω
′
,
(2.2)
where σ represents the price-elasticity of the spending share on an individual good, and Pt is
the welfare based price index. Nt is the measure of the set Ωt. Household consumption, Ct, is
given by Ct = Ct
M + (1− Lt)hp.
2.2.2 Production
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, each producing a different variety
ω ∈ Ω. There is a one-to-one identification between a producer, product and a firm. Following
Bilbiie et al. (2012), each unit in the model is best interpreted as a production line within a
multi-product firm whose boundary is left undetermined. There is a continuum of jobs within
each firm performed by one worker. Production requires labour and capital. Entry of new
firms is endogenously determined following Bilbiie et al. (2007). Firms must post a vacancy in
order to hire a worker incurring a real fixed cost κ.
Job creation is subject to matching frictions. The probability of finding a worker is de-
termined by a Cobb-Douglas matching technology which converts aggregate vacancies into
aggregate matches: Mt = χUt
εVt
1−ε, where 0 < ε < 1. Each firm meets workers at a rate
qt(θt) ≡ MtVt . θ =
Vt
Ut
denotes labour market tightness. Each filled job produces Ztzitk
α
iωt units
of output. Zt, aggregate productivity is common to all firms, while zit, the match-specific
productivity of a job is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. kiω is the stock of capital allocated
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to the job. The level of idiosyncratic productivity is a draw from a time-invariant log normal
function g(z). Zt follows an AR(1) process in logs.
Producer ω’s output is given by:
yωt = Ztlωt[1−G(zcωt)]−1
∫ ∞
zcωt
kωt(z)zg(z)dz, (2.3)
where lωt represents the measure of jobs within the firm and z
c
ωt is an endogenously determined
critical threshold which determines the measure of jobs endogenously destroyed, G(zcωt). This
occurs when zt < z
c
ωt. Firms incur a real cost of F from terminating a job which constitutes
an administrative cost.
The evolution of firm employment is given by:
lωt = (1− λωt)(lωt−1 + qt−1vωt−1) (2.4)
where λωt ≡ λx + (1 − λx)G(zcωt) is the total fraction of jobs destroyed within the firm.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period: (i) jobs are exogenously
destroyed; (ii) aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are realized; (iii) the productivity cut-off zc is
determined and unprofitable matches are endogenously destroyed. In addition, wage bargaining
takes place and new firms enter into the market; (iv) production and market clearing occur;
(v) new matches are formed; (vi) at the end of the period, exogenous producer exit takes place.
2.2.2.1 Profit maximization
Yt denotes aggregate demand in the economy, which has the same translog form as household
consumption. Each producer ω faces the following demand for its output:
yωt = σln(
p¯
pωt
)
PtYt
pωt
, (2.5)
where ln p¯ =
1
σNt
+
1
Nt
∫
ω∈Ωt ln pωtdω is the maximum price a producer can charge to retain
a positive market share.
Total output for producer ω, denoted with yωt, exhibits constant returns to scale in labour
and capital:
yωt = Ztz˜ωtkωt
αlωt
1−α (2.6)
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where z˜ωt ≡ [ 1
1−G(zcωt)
]
∫∞
ωt z
1
1− αg(z)dz]1−α is the weighted average of the idiosyncratic
productivity of jobs within the firm.
The firm’s per period real profit is given by:
dωt = ρωtyωt − w˜ωtlωt − rtkωt − κvωt −G(zcωt)(1− λx)(lωt−1 + qt−1vωt)F, (2.7)
where ρωt =
pωt
Pt
denotes the relative price of ω in units of consumption and rt is the rental rate
of capital. w˜ωt ≡ z˜ωt ≡ [ 1
1−G(zcωt)
]
∫∞
ωt wωt(z)g(z)dz is the average wage. The firm chooses
the price of its product ρωt, employment lωt, capital kωt, the number of vacancy postings vωt,
and the job destruction threshold zcωt, to maximize the present discounted value of real profit:
Et[Σ
∞
s=tβs,t(1− δ)s−tdωs], subject to (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6).
The job creation equation for producer ω is derived from combining the first-order condi-
tions for lωt and vωt:
κ
qt
= (1− δ)(1− λx)E
[
βt,t+1[(1−G(zcωt))(Π˜ωt+1 − w˜ωt+1 +
κ
qt+1
)−G(zcωt+1F ]
]
(2.8)
where Π˜ωt ≡ (1−α)ϕωtyωt/lωt. ϕωt denotes the real marginal cost of the firm. Equation (2.8)
shows that optimality in job creation requires that the marginal cost of posting a vacancy is
equal to its marginal benefit. The first order condition for the job-productivity threshold zcωt
leads to the following job destruction equation:
Π(zcωt)− w(zcωt) +
κ
qt
= −F (2.9)
where Π(zcωt ≡ Π˜ωt(zcωt/z˜ωt)
1
1−α is the marginal revenue product of a match. Optimality
requires that the value of the firm of a job with productivity zcωt is equal to zero.
The first order condition for kωt equalizes the marginal cost of capital to its marginal
revenue product: rt = αϕωtyωt/kωt. The first order condition with respect to pωt implies
that the relative price of a variety is a markup over marginal costs: ρωt = ϕωtµωt, where
µωt = θωt/(θωt− 1). The model features a symmetric equilibrium therefore incumbents charge
the same price.
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2.2.2.2 Wage setting
Wage setting follows Krause and Lubik (2007). Workers and firms bargain over the match
surplus (the sum of the gains to the worker from employment and to the firm employing the
worker). The exogenous bargaining weight η ∈ (0, 1) determines the workers’ bargaining power.
The wage paid to each worker is a weighted average between the marginal revenue of labour
(plus a firing cost term) of the match and the worker’s outside option, $t. It is given by:
wωt = η[piωt + [1− (1− δ)(1− λx)Etβt,t−1]F ] + (1− η)$t (2.10)
This leads to the following equation for the average wage:
w˜ωt = η[p˜iωt + [1− (1− δ)(1− λx)Etβt,t−1]F ] + (1− η)$t (2.11)
The worker’s outside option, $t, corresponding to the value of unemployment is given by the
following expression:
$t ≡ hp + ub+
∫ ∞
ω⊂Ωt
st
vωt
Vt
Et[β˜t,t−1(1−G(zcωt+1))∆˜Wωt+1]dω, (2.12)
where st is the job finding probability and ∆˜
W
ωt is the average worker surplus. The value of
unemployment includes ub, which are are lump-sum financed unemployment benefits from the
government in units of the consumption basket. It also includes home production, hp, and the
expected discounted value of searching for other jobs, the third term in the expression.
2.2.2.3 Firm entry and symmetry among producers
Firm entry and exit decisions follow Bilbiie et al. (2012), and Ghironi and Melits (2005).
In every period, there is an unbounded mass, NEt, of prospective entrants and a mass Nt
of producing firms. Prospective entrants are forward-looking and correctly anticipate their
future profits dωs in every period s > t. The model features a one-period time-to-build lag,
such that, firms who enter in period t, do not start production until t+1. Prospective entrants
compute their expected post-entry value, equal to the present discounted value of their stream
of future profits: eωt ≡ Et[Σ∞s=t+1βs,t(1 − δ)s−tdωs]. Prior to entry, firms face a sunk entry
cost which must be paid before production commences, fE,ωt ≡ fR + fT + κveωt. It is formed
of three components: fR and fT represent regulatory and administrative barriers to entry
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and the technological entry cost (in terms of goods and services), respectively. The last term,
κveωt represents the cost of posting vacancies in order to recruit workers for production. In
equilibrium, veωt = (lt + qtvt)/qt, which means that the cost of posting vacancies for new
entrants responds to aggregate labour market conditions.
The model features a symmetric equilibrium. The outside option of firms depend only
on aggregate shocks which means that, in equilibrium, firms choose identical job-productivity
thresholds zcωt = z
c
t . This also implies that marginal costs, and thus, prices, quantities, and
firm values are identical across firms. Entry occurs until firm value is equalized to the entry
cost, leading to the free entry condition, et = fE,t, which is independent of the length of time
which has been spent in the market.
2.2.2.4 Household budget constraint and first-stage budgeting
Households hold shares in a mutual fund of firms and own the economy’s stock of capital,
Kt. xt represents the share in the mutual fund held by the representative household entering
period t, and xt+1 the amount of shares in a mutual fund of firms consisting of incumbent firms
and new entrants (Nt +NEt) purchased by the representative household in t + 1. The date-t
price of a share in the mutual fund is equal to the price of claims to future firm real profits,
et. Physical capital, Kt obeys a standard law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + IKt[1− (ν/2)(IKt/IKt−1 − 1)2], (2.13)
where ν > 0 is a scale parameter. The per-period household’s budget constraint is given by:
Ct + et(Nt +NEt)xt+1 + IKt = (dt + et)Ntxt + w˜tLt + rtKt + (hp + ub)(1− Lt) + Tt, (2.14)
where T are lump-sum taxes. The household maximizes its expected intertemporal utility
subject to the above budget constraint and law of motion for physical capital. The Euler
equation for share holdings is given by: et = Et[βt,t+1(dt+1 + et+1)]; the Euler equation for
capital accumulation requires the following condition: ζKt = Etβt, t+ 1[rt+1 + (1− δK)ζKt+1],
where ζKt represents the shadow value of capital in units of consumption. The first-order
condition for investment, IKt is given by:
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1 = ζKt[1− ν
2
(
IKt
IKt−1
)2− ν( IKt
IKt−1
− 1)( IKt
IKt−1
)] + νβt,t+1Et[ζKt+1(
IKt
IKt−1
− 1)( IKt
IKt−1
)2] (2.15)
2.2.3 Equilibrium
The elasticity of substitution across varieties in the symmetric equilibrium is given by: Θt =
1+σNt. Aggregate employment can be written as: Lt = NtLt. Aggregate vacancies is given by
the sum of vacancy postings by existing firms and new entrants: Vt = (Nt+NEt)vt+NEtlt/qt.
The law of motion of aggregate employment can be written as:
Lt = (1− δ)(1− λx)[1−G(zct )][Lt−1 + qt−1Vt−1] (2.16)
The aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as:
Yt = C
M
t + IKt +NEt(fR + fE) + κVt + Ft, (2.17)
where Ft denotes aggregate firing costs. The main model equations are summarized in Table
2.1. The model features 10 endogenous variables: Ct, ρt, Nt+1, Lt, Vt, Mt, z
c
t , Kt+1, It, ξK .
Also, the model has one exogenous variable, aggregate productivity Zt.
2.3 Fiscal policy and inefficiency in the decentralized CF econ-
omy
2.3.1 Inefficiency wedges
In the BGM model, two distortions, namely, the misalignment distortion and the non-
synchronization of markups across time, respectively, create a divergence between the planner
and competitive equilibria. In contrast, in the CF model, five distortions (and inefficiency
wedges) exist 1. The difference in the number of inefficiency wedges across models results from
important differences. Firstly, markup non-synchronization across time is not a distortion in
the CF framework because firm entry costs are not a function of marginal costs in contrast to
the BGM setup. Secondly, capital is a factor of production in the CF model. Firm’s monopoly
1The inefficiency wedges outlined in CF include the distortionary effects of regulation. Therefore, these are
the inefficiency wedges which are present under the rigid perspective.
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Table 2.1: Model Summary
Adjusted Discount Factor βt,t+1 = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
Firm-level job separation λt = λ
x + (1− λx)G(ztc)
Law of motion of aggregate employment (1− λt)(1− δ)(Lt−1 + q(θt−1)Vt−1)
Law of motion of physical capital Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + IKt[1− (ν/2)(IKt/IKt−1 − 1)2]
Aggregate Unemployment Ut = (1− Lt)
Average wage w˜ωt = η[p˜iωt + [1− (1− δ)(1− λx)Etβt,t−1]F ] + (1− η)$t
Vacancies by entrants vet = (lt + qtvt)/qt
Aggregate matching function Mt = χ(1− Lt)εVt−ε
Probability of filling a vacancy qt = Mt/Vt
Job finding probability st = Mt/Ut
Job creation κ
qt
= (1− δ)(1− λx)E
[
βt,t+1[(1−G(zcωt))(Π˜ωt+1 − w˜ωt+1 +
κ
qt+1
)−G(zcωt+1F ]
]
Job destruction Π(zcωt)− w(zcωt) +
κ
qt
= −F
Pricing ρt = µtϕt
Markup µt(Nt) = µt = 1 +
1
σNt
Variety effect ρt = e
−
N˜ −Nt
2σN˜Nt
Profits d = (1− 1
µt
)
Yt
Nt
+ ψtlt − κ(vt + lt
qt
)− [ G(zt
c)
1−G(ztc) ]
Free entry vt = fE,t, where fE,t = fR + fT + κv
e
t
Number of firms Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1)
Euler equation (shares) vt = (1− δ)Etβt,t+1(vt+1 + dt+1)
Euler equation (physical capital) ζKt = Etβt, t+ 1[rt+1 + (1− δK)ζKt+1]
Aggregate Output Yt = C
M
t + IKt +NEt(fR + fT ) + κVt + Ft
Aggregate Accounting CMt + IKt +NEt(fR + fT ) = w˜tLt + rtKt +Ntdt
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power creates a divergence between the first order condition for capital accumulation in the
decentralized and planner equilibria, respectively. Thirdly, CF features endogenous job creation
and job destruction in contrast to BGM. Firm’s monopoly power and market regulation in the
decentralized economy create distortions in the labour market. Finally, the presence of entry
barriers (product market regulation) and firing costs generate an additional inefficiency wedge
along the consumption output margin.
CF outline the five inefficiency wedges which characterize the competitive equilibrium.
These are as follows:
ΣPC,t ≡ (1− δ)E
[
βt,t+1
Yt+1
Nt+1
[
1
2σNt+1fT
− (1− 1/µt+1)
fT + fR
]
]
ΣJC,t ≡ Et qt
κ
βt,t+1(1− λtott+1)[(1− ε)(1− α)
Yt+1
Lt+1
[1− z
c
t+1
z˜t+1
)
1
1−αΥµ,t+1 +
ΥF
[1−G(zct )]
]
ΣJD,t ≡ qt
κ(qtεθt − 1)(1− ε)(1− α)
Yt
Lt
(
zct
z˜t
)
1
1−αΥµ,t + (1− ε)Υb − [1− η(1− Etβ˜t,t+1(1− st))]ΥF
ΣK,t ≡ αEtβt,t+1 Yt+1
ζKtKt+1
Υµ,t+1
ΣY,t ≡ G(z
c
t )
1−G(zct )
LtΥF + ΥRNE,t,
where Υµ,t ≡ 1− 1/µt, ΥF ≡ F , Υb ≡ ub, β˜t,t+1 ≡ (1− δ)(1− λx)βt,t+1.
All five inefficiency wedges with the exception of ΣK,t are created by multiple distortions.
The first inefficiency wedge, ΣPC,t, is the product creation wedge. It results from two dis-
tortions. The first is the distortion created by regulation-related barriers to entry or product
market regulation, fR. The second is the misalignment of the profit rate (1 − 1/µt) and the
welfare benefit product variety ( 12σNt ). As explained by Bilbiie et al. (2008), this distortion
occurs if entrants do not take into account the benefit of an additional variety to consumers, on
the one hand, and the negative effect entry has on the profit of incumbent firms, on the other.
When there are no barriers to entry (fR = 0), and the profit incentives of firms match the
variety benefit (1− 1/µt = 12σNt ), the level of product creation is efficient. The only distortion
common to both CF and BGM is the misalignment distortion.
In the CF framework, the first order conditions for firm-level employment and vacancies,
respectively, determine job creation. In addition, the optimal job-productivity threshold, zct ,
determines the measure of jobs which are endogenously destroyed. Endogenous job creation
and destruction create two additional margins along which distortions occur. The inefficiency
wedges in job creation and job destruction, ΣJC,t and ΣJD,t, respectively, both feature the
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distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly power (indicated by the profit rate, 1 − 1µ), and firing
costs, ΥF . Monopoly power, by generating a sub-optimal marginal revenue product of a match,
creates distortions in job creation and job destruction, respectively. In addition, unemployment
benefits, Υb, are an additional distortion along the job destruction margin as it raises the
workers’ outside option above its efficient level. Bilbiie et al. (2008) assume labour supply is
either exogenously determined or determined by households 2. In addition, job destruction is
also exogenously determined. Therefore, these inefficiency wedges are absent.
The wedge in capital accumulation, ΣK,t, occurs due to firm’s monopoly power, leading
to an inefficient level of investment. Given that capital is absent in Bilbiie et al. (2008),
inefficiencies in capital accumulation do not exist. Lastly, the consumption-output inefficiency
wedge, ΣY,t, results from regulation along two dimensions, namely, fR and ΥF , which lead
to the diversion of resources away from consumption and other economic activities including,
product and vacancy creation. As previously mentioned, ΣY,t is the only wedge which is the
result of distortions created by regulation alone. Given the absence of regulation in the BGM
framework, there is no distortion in the resource constraint for consumption output.
2.3.2 Fiscal policy and inefficiency in the CF framework
I consider the effect of four fiscal policy instruments which can restore efficiency in product
creation in the market equilibrium of a decentralized flexible and rigid economy, respectively.
The flexible perspective refers to the CF model without regulation-related distortions. Under
the rigid perspective, on the other hand, regulation creates distortions in the competitive
equilibrium. The market economy and planner allocations coincide when all inefficiency wedges
are eliminated at all points in time. This can only occur under the flexible perspective as the
presence of regulation under the rigid perspective means that the efficient allocation is not
achievable.
Under the flexible perspective, the consumption-output inefficiency wedge, ΣY,t, which oc-
curs only as a result of regulatory entry barriers and firing costs, does not exist. Therefore,
only four inefficiency wedges are present. Given that economies are often modelled as facing
market regulation as in CF (also representing the rigid economy), among others, 3 it is impor-
2I focus on the optimal policy results in Bilbiie et al. (2008) for which labour supply is exogenous.
3see for example, Cacciatore et al. (2012), Cacciatore et al. (2016a), Cacciatore et al. (2016b), Ebell and
Haefke (2003), Fiori et al. (2007).
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tant to consider the effect of fiscal policy on inefficiency when regulation is present. All five
inefficiency wedges detailed above are initially present prior to the implementation of any fiscal
instrument under the rigid perspective. Also, under this perspective, the consumption-output
inefficiency wedge, ΣY,t, which contains only regulation-related distortions, is always present.
The fiscal instruments considered include i) an entry tax/subsidy or (de)regulation policy;
ii) a sales subsidy; iii) a dividend tax; 4 and iv) marginal cost pricing. i), ii) and iv) are
shown in Bilbiie et al. (2008) to restore efficiency in product creation. It is expected that
the policies considered can implement optimum product creation in the flexible variant of the
CF framework given that the product creation wedge in CF is the result of a distortion also
present in BGM, and regulation does not create a distortion in product creation under this
perspective.
The entry conditions in BGM and CF are almost identical. The major difference is that
sunk entry costs are in terms of effective labour units in BGM, while in CF entry costs are in
terms of the consumption basket. This means that the misalignment distortion, which leads
to inefficiency in product creation, manifests in a similar way in both. Although, it is expected
that the fiscal polices which eliminate inefficiency in product creation in BGM can do so in CF,
the optimal values of the fiscal instruments are likely to differ given that there is an additional
distortion in product creation in BGM owing to the non-synchronization of markups across
time. In addition, it is possible to assess whether marginal cost pricing, which can address the
distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly power, can implement the planner allocation under the
flexible perspective.
Under the rigid perspective, I can examine the effect of eliminating non-regulation related
distortions on the inefficiency wedges present in the decentralized equilibrium. In addition, it is
possible to numerically evaluate the effect of the fiscal instruments considered on the magnitude
of the inefficiency wedges and overall efficiency. Eliminating the misalignment distortion does
not restore efficiency in product creation under the rigid perspective because fR will still be
present in the product creation equation. I can also numerically examine whether eliminating
the misalignment distortion in product creation can reduce the product creation wedge. In
4In Bilbiie et al. (2008), the optimal policy is a combination of dividend taxation and a consumption tax. This
is because there are two distortions in product creation - the misalignment distortion and the non-synchronization
of markups, respectively. However, the second distortion in product creation is absent in the CF framework.
Therefore, only the dividend tax needs to be considered.
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addition, I can assess whether the instrument used to eliminate the misalignment distortion
matters for the magnitude of other wedges and overall efficiency.
2.4 Flexible Perspective
As previously mentioned, I examine the effect of four fiscal instruments on the inefficiency
wedges present in the decentralized equilibrium. The flexible perspective is similar to BGM in
that there are only two sources of distortion in the decentralized economy. However, in contrast
to BGM where both distortions create inefficiency in product creation/firm entry, in the flexible
CF economy, one distortion (the misalignment distortion) affects product creation while the
other (firm’s monopoly power) creates distortions in job creation, job destruction and capital
accumulation, respectively. First, I explore a marginal cost pricing policy (in conjunction with
lump-sum taxation). I then examine the impact of other fiscal policies targeting inefficiency in
product creation and their impact on the other inefficiency wedges. As previously mentioned,
the consumption output constraint, ΣY,t, which contains only regulation-related distortions, is
absent under this perspective.
Three policies, namely a sales subsidy, an entry subsidy, and a dividend tax, respectively,
are expected to restore efficiency in product creation. I find that there are tax/subsidy rates
for which optimality in product creation is achieved in the decentralized equilibrium. For
overall efficiency to be realized, the distortions created by firm’s monopoly power needs to
be eliminated while at the same time inducing the optimal degree of product variety - that
is, eliminating the misalignment distortion. When this occurs, the competitive and planner
equilibria coincide.
When fiscal policies which have no effect on firm pricing are implemented, namely an
entry subsidy or a dividend tax, the consequence is that only the wedge in product creation
can be eliminated. In addition, the other inefficiency wedges are unaffected. On the other
hand, I find that marginal cost pricing is able to restore efficiency in the decentralized equi-
librium. Although the sales subsidy affects firm pricing, its implementation is not designed
to ensure marginal cost pricing which means it does not eliminate the distortionary effect of
firm’s monopoly power. I first show that marginal cost pricing is able to restore efficiency in
the decentralized equilibrium. I then define the subsidy/tax rates which restore efficiency in
product creation under the other fiscal policies.
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2.4.1 Marginal cost pricing
I examine the policy of a sales subsidy to firms with lump sum taxation of firms and house-
holds which implements marginal cost pricing. As mentioned previously, marginal cost pricing
eliminates the two distortions present in the decentralized equilibrium. As in Bilbiie et al.
(2008), under this policy, firm sales are taxed/subsidized at a rate τt. In addition, each firm is
taxed lump sum to finance a fraction, γt, of the sales tax.
Proposition 1: The competitive equilibrium resulting from a sales tax which implements
marginal cost pricing, financed by lump sum taxes on firms and households, coincides with the
planner allocation if and only if households pay half of the sales tax burden. This means that
the proportion of taxes paid by households, γt satisfies:
γ∗t = 1−
t
µt − 1,
where t =
1
2σNt
.
Proof. With no firing costs and a sales subsidy, τt, firm profits are given by:
dt = (1 + τt)ρtyt − w˜tlt − rtkt − κvt − TFt
where the first term is the sales revenue inclusive of the subsidy and the final term is
the portion of lump sum taxes paid by the firm to finance the sales subsidy. Optimal pricing
implies that the relative price, ρt, is equal to
µt
(1 + τt)
ϕt. The profit function can be re-written
as:
dt = (1 + τt)ρtyt − w˜tlt − αϕtyt − ρt(1 + τt)
µt
yt + ϕtyt − κvt − TFt
The total sales subsidy is equal to τtρtNtyt. Therefore, the share of taxes paid by the
firm, TFt , is given by γtτtρtyt, where γt represents the share paid by firms. Substituting in the
expression for the share of the sales tax paid by the firm, profits are then given by:
dt = (1 + τt)ρtyt − (1 + τt)ρtyt
µt
− γtτtρtyt + (1− α)ϕtyt − w˜tlt − κvt
The Euler equation for shares is given by:
fT + κ(
lt
qt
+ vt) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + κ( lt+1
qt+1
+ vt+1) + dt+1]
This can be re-written as the following product creation equation after substituting the
profit function into the expression:
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fT = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + (1− 1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
The corresponding equation under the planner equilibrium is given by:
fT = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + ( 12σNt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
Plugging the above expression for profits into the product creation equation under the
competitive equilibrium transforms it into the following expression:
fT = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + (1 + (1− γt+1)τt+1 − 1+τt+1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
The misalignment distortion is eliminated when the sales subsidy and the share of taxes
paid by firms, respectively, are set such that the profit rate is aligned with the benefit of
variety. As in Bilbiie et al. (2008), the optimal value of 1 + τt = µt. In addition, the optimal
share of taxes paid by firms is given by γt =
1
2 . This makes the product creation equation in
the decentralized economy equivalent to the planner’s. Also, the distortionary effect of firm’s
monopoly power no longer exists because the optimal tax rate generates marginal cost pricing.
The results are consistent with the findings of Bilbiie et al. (2008). Marginal cost pricing
in combination with an equal split of the sales subsidy between households and firms to finance
the sales subsidy eliminates the misalignment distortion. In Bilbiie et al. (2008), marginal cost
pricing also eliminates the distortion created by the non-synchronization of markups across
time, a distortion which is not present in the CF framework because sunk entry costs are not
a function of marginal costs. Similarly, marginal cost pricing eliminates a distortion which
exists in CF but not in the BGM framework - the distortion of firm’s monopoly power which
creates inefficiency in the labour market and in capital accumulation. In the flexible CF model,
marginal cost pricing therefore implements the planner allocation. That is, all four inefficiency
wedges in the decentralized economy are equal to zero following the implementation of this
policy.
2.4.2 Fiscal policies and inefficiency in the flexible economy
In this section, I examine other fiscal policies considered in Bilbiie et al. (2008). I show that
these instruments will still allow the distortion from firm’s monopoly power to persist under
the flexible competitive CF equilibrium and that these policies will only eliminate inefficiency
in product creation. The fiscal policies discussed include: 1) A dividend tax; 2) An entry
subsidy/tax; 3) A sales subsidy.
33
Bilbiie et al. (2008) show that a dividend tax implemented in conjunction with a con-
sumption tax restores efficiency in the BGM economy. The dividend tax addresses the mis-
alignment distortion, whereas the consumption tax addresses the distortion created by the
non-synchronization of markups. As previously mentioned, the second distortion does not fea-
ture in the CF economy, therefore, I only consider the effect of the dividend tax. Both the
dividend tax and the sales subsidy have identical effects on inefficiency wedges. These policies
are only able to restore efficiency in product creation, leaving the distortions in other wedges
unaffected.
2.4.2.1 Dividend taxation and inefficiency
A dividend (profit) tax imposed on firms can be used to bring entry incentive in line with
the benefit of variety. Suppose the planner imposes a dividend tax on firms at a rate τD, the
following Proposition identifies the path of the dividend tax which eliminates the misalignment
distortion, or equivalently, restores efficiency in product creation:
Proposition 2: A dividend tax eliminates the product creation wedge if :
1− τDt ∗ = (
1
2σNt
)(
µt
µt − 1).
Proof. The dividend tax affects the misalignment distortion through the Euler equation
for share holdings, which will now feature this tax instrument:
et = Et[βt,t+1((1− τDt+1)dt+1 + et+1)]
The product creation equation becomes:
fT = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + (1− τDt+1)(1−
1
µt+1
)
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
Optimality in product creation, that is, equality of the welfare benefit of variety and the
profit rate, requires:
1− τDt ∗ = (
1
2σNt
)(
µt
µt − 1),
Implementing a dividend tax does not affect price setting by firms. The relative price is
still a markup over marginal cost. Therefore, the optimal price is unaffected by this instrument
which means that the distortion Υµ,t still exists. As shown below, the only wedge which is
eliminated is the product creation wedge. All other inefficiency wedges are unaltered. 5
5The superscript fl denotes the flexible economy.
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ΣflPC,t ≡ 0
ΣflJC,t ≡ Et
qt
κ
βt,t+1(1− λtott+1)[(1− ε)(1− α)
Yt+1
Lt+1
[1− z
c
t+1
z˜t+1
)
1
1−αΥµ,t+1]
ΣflJD,t ≡
qt
κ(qtεθt − 1)(1− ε)(1− α)
Yt
Lt
(
zct
z˜t
)
1
1−αΥµ,t
ΣflK,t ≡ αEtβt,t+1
Yt+1
ζKtKt+1
Υµ,t+1
2.4.2.2 Entry Subsidy/Tax and inefficiency
I examine a policy whereby the technological entry costs, fT , is subsidized at a rate, φt. In the
CF framework, in contrast to BGM, the cost of recruiting labour is part of the sunk entry cost
firms face. I, however, focus on fT as the result is not affected by this assumption. Proposition
3 finds the optimal path of the entry tax which restores efficiency in product creation.
Proposition 3: In order for a subsidy to firm entry to restore efficiency in product cre-
ation, the following condition must be satisfied :
1− φ∗t = (1−
1
µt
)2σNt.
Proof. A firm subsidy of φt transforms the product creation equation into:
(1− φt)(fT ) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(1− φt)fT + (1− 1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
Comparing the above equation with the product creation equation in the planner economy
shows that a value of φt satisfying the above proposition generates the optimal path for the
entry subsidy. Plugging the expression for the optimal subsidy (1 − φ∗t = (1 −
1
µt
)2σNt) into
the product creation equation:
((1− 1
µt+1
)2σNt)(fT ) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [((1− 1
µt+1
)2σNt)fT + (1− 1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
This implies:
(2σNt)(fT ) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(2σNt+1)(fT ) + Yt+1
Nt+1
]
Simplifying the above expression leads to the product creation equation given by the
planner allocation:
fT = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + ( 12σNt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
Again, because this instrument does not affect pricing, as in the case of dividend taxation,
it has no effect on the profit rate of firms, which means that the distortionary effect of firm’s
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monopoly power persists. Also, because no other inefficiency wedge features the misalignment
distortion present in product creation, an entry subsidy has no effect on any other inefficiency
wedges.
2.4.2.3 A Sales Subsidy and inefficiency
A sales subsidy can also eliminate inefficiency along the product creation margin. As shown
by Bilbiie et al. (2008), this can be achieved through implementing an optimal subsidy rate
in combination with the lump-sum taxation of firms, whereby firms bear the total burden
of the subsidy. The subsidy rate which restores efficiency in product creation is derived for
the flexible perspective. It is shown that there is no way to implement a sales subsidy in
a way which simultaneously eliminates the misalignment distortion and the distortion from
monopolistic pricing without inducing marginal cost pricing in the way discussed above - by
setting τt = µ− 1 and γt, the fraction of the lump sum tax paid by firms, to a half. With the
sales subsidy, as detailed in this section, the subsidy rate is unable to simultaneously eliminate
both distortions given that the subsidy rate which restores efficiency in product creation differs
from that which eliminates the distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly power. Therefore, a sales
subsidy financed by a lump sum tax on firms either eliminates the misalignment distortion or
firm’s monopoly power but not both. This is be shown below. However, because the subsidy
rate affects firm pricing, it also affects the distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly power in
other inefficiency wedges.
Proposition 4: A sales subsidy, financed by a lump sum tax on firm profits, eliminates
the product creation wedge if :
1 + τ∗t =
µt(2σNt − 1)
2σNt
.
Proof. As in the case of marginal cost pricing, the optimal pricing equation, ρt =
µt
(1 + τt)
ϕt, implies that firm profits are given by:
dt = (1 + τt)ρtyt − w˜tlt − αϕtyt − ρt(1 + τt)
µt
yt + ϕtyt − κvt − TFt ,
where TFt = τtρtyt is the total sales tax imposed on the firm. The profit function can be
written as:
dt = (1 + τt)ρtyt − (1 + τt)ρtyt
µt
− τtρtNtyt + (1− α)ϕtyt − w˜tlt − κvt
This transforms the product creation equation into:
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fT = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [fT + (1− 1+τt+1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
In order to eliminate the misalignment distortion, thereby restoring efficiency in product
creation, the subsidy rate τt should satisfy the following equation:
1 + τ∗t =
µt(2σNt − 1)
2σNt
This is the subsidy rate detailed in Proposition 4. The distortion from monopoly power
is eliminated when the profit rate, 1 − 1+τtµt = 0 or 1 + τt = µt. This condition cannot be
satisfied under the subsidy rate for optimum product creation. That is, there is no value
of τt which satisfies both optimum product creation and eliminates the distortionary effect
of firm’s monopoly power by implementing marginal cost pricing. The subsidy rate which
restores efficiency in product creation in the flexible CF economy differs from that in the BGM
framework due to the additional dynamic distortion (non-synchronization of markups) that
exists in BGM.
The other four inefficiency wedges in the CF economy still exist under this policy given
that the distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly power persists. However, this policy has
implications for pricing which affects the profit rate (in contrast to the previous two policies).
Therefore, implementing this policy will have an effect on the distortionary effect created by
firm’s monopoly power in the other three inefficiency wedges. The magnitude of the wedges at
any point in time will depend on the rate of subsidy.
As with the previous fiscal policies, the sales subsidy, as defined above, eliminates the
product creation wedge. However, in contrast to a dividend tax and an entry tax, it also
affects the distortion from firm’s monopoly power in other inefficiency wedges through the
profit rate. The inefficiency wedges are defined as follows:
ΣflPC,t ≡ 0
ΣflJC,t ≡ Et
qt
κ
βt,t+1(1− λtott+1)[(1− ε)(1− α)
Yt+1
Lt+1
[1− z
c
t+1
z˜t+1
)
1
1−αΥµ,t+1]
ΣflJD,t ≡
qt
κ(qtεθt − 1)(1− ε)(1− α)
Yt
Lt
(
zct
z˜t
)
1
1−αΥµ,t
ΣflK,t ≡ αEtβt,t+1
Yt+1
ζKtKt+1
Υµ,t+1
where Υµ,t, the profit rate, is now given by: 1 − [2σNt − 1
2σNt
]. The magnitude of this
distortion still depends solely on the number of goods in the economy (and the price-elasticity
of the spending share on an individual good, σ), as in the baseline flexible economy, but is now
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given by a different expression.
In summary, there are tax/subsidy rates which restore efficiency in product creation in the
flexible variant of the CF framework. These differ from the tax/subsidy rates in Bilbiie et al.
(2008) given differences in the characterization of entry costs. Overall efficiency can only be
achieved via marginal cost pricing (in combination with lump-sum taxation) which can also
address the distortionary effect created by firm’s monopoly power in contrast to the other fiscal
policies. Implementing an entry tax or a dividend tax has no effect on other inefficiency wedges
because it has no effect on price setting. In addition, although pricing is affected under a sales
tax, this policy does not eliminate the distortions in job creation, job destruction and capital
accumulation, respectively, created by firm’s monopoly power.
2.5 Rigid perspective
I examine the impact of fiscal policy instruments, in combination with lump sum taxation, on
the inefficiency wedges in the baseline CF equilibrium. This is the decentralized equilibrium
that occurs when three dimensions of regulation are introduced into the flexible variant of
the CF economy. Market regulation includes firing costs, F , sunk entry costs from regulatory
requirements, fR, and unemployment benefits, ub. As mentioned previously, in contrast to the
flexible perspective, a consumption output inefficiency wedge, ΣY,t, features in the rigid CF
equilibrium. It is defined as
G(zct )
1−G(zct )
LtΥF + ΥRNE,t.
As under the flexible perspective, there are tax/subsidy rates for the instruments con-
sidered under the flexible perspective which can be used to align the entry incentive of firms
with the benefit consumers derive from an additional variety. It can be shown that the same
tax/subsidy rates which eliminate the misalignment wedge obtain under the rigid perspective.
However, in contrast to the flexible perspective, these rates do not restore efficiency in product
creation due to the distortionary effect of fR.
The Euler equation for shares under the rigid perspective, prior to the implementation of
fiscal policy instruments, is given by:
(fT + fR) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + (1− 1µt )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
The only difference with the corresponding equation under the flexible perspective is the
presence of fR on both sides of the equation, as an additional component of sunk entry costs,
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fE,t. Following the elimination of the misalignment distortion, the presence of fR means that
there is now a residual product creation wedge which persists under the fiscal instruments
considered. The (residual) product creation wedge owing solely to the distortion from fR is
given by:
ΣrigPC,t ≡
(1− δ)
fT
E
[
βt,t+1
Yt+1
Nt+1
[− ΥR
(1 + σNt+1)(fT + ΥR)
]
]
.
2.5.1 Marginal cost pricing
As under the flexible perspective, a marginal cost pricing policy which eliminates the mis-
alignment distortions involves a sales subsidy to firms, a proportion, γt, of which is financed
by imposing a lump sum tax on firms. The burden of tax on households is given by: Tt =
−ub(1− Lt) + (1− γt)ρtytNt.
The Euler equation for shares becomes:
(fT + fR) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + (1 + (1− γt)τt − 1+τµt )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
As before, optimal pricing implies: ρt =
µ
(1 + τt)
ϕ, where τt is the subsidy rate. Also,
the values of τt and γt, which eliminate the distortionary effect of monopoly power and the
misalignment distortion, respectively, from the decentralized economy, are given by 1 + τt = µt
and γt =
1
2 . This is because the presence of fR neither affects firm pricing nor profits. Since
the subsidy rate implements marginal cost pricing, the distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly
power along the job creation, job destruction, and capital accumulation margins, respectively,
will be eliminated. Marginal cost pricing implies the following inefficiency wedges:
ΣrigJC,t ≡ Et
qt
κ
βt,t+1(1− λtott+1)
ΥF
[1−G(zct )]
ΣrigJD,t ≡
qt
κ(qtεθt − 1) [(1− ε)Υb − [1− η(1− Etβ˜t,t+1(1− st))]ΥF ]
ΣrigK,t ≡ 0,
Given that the distortion from firm’s monopoly power is the only distortion which exists
along the capital accumulation margin, this wedge is the only wedge which is eliminated. This
distortion also ceases to exist along the job creation and job destruction margins, respectively.
In contrast to the baseline rigid equilibrium, firing costs are the only distortion along the job
creation margin. Similarly, inefficiency in job destruction is as a result of the distortions from
firing costs and unemployment benefits.
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2.5.2 A Sales Subsidy and inefficiency
As under the flexible perspective, a sales subsidy, τt, to firm sales implies the following optimal
pricing equation: ρωt =
µ
(1 + τt)
ϕ
The product creation equation is then given by:
(fT + fR) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + (1− 1+τt+1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
Eliminating the misalignment distortion in the product creation equation requires setting
τt the same as in the flexible state of the world. That is, τt should obey the following rule:
1 + τ∗t =
µt(2σNt − 1)
2σNt
In contrast to the corresponding policy under the flexible scenario, all inefficiency wedges
are present. Given that the same tax rate eliminates the misalignment distortion under the
rigid and flexible perspectives, Υµ,t is still given by the expression: 1 − [2σNt − 1
2σNt
]. The job
creation, job destruction, and capital accumumation inefficiency wedges are as follows:
ΣrigJC,t ≡ ΣJC,t
ΣrigJD,t ≡ ΣJD,t
ΣrigK,t ≡ ΣK,t
2.5.3 Entry and inefficiency
I assume that the entry subsidy to firms covers both fR and fT , i.e., the policy maker subsidizes
the sum of these two entry costs. I also assume that fiscal policy does not seek to eliminate
fT in the decentralized economy given that it is present in the planner economy.
An entry subsidy to firms, φt, implies that the product creation equation is given by:
(1− φ∗t )(fT + fR) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(1− φt)(fT + fR) + (1− 1µt+1 )
Yt+1
Nt+1
]
As previously, the rate of the entry subsidy which eliminates the misalignment distortion
is given by: 1−φt = (1− 1
µt
)2σNt. Substituting for the wedge minimizing value of 1−φt, and
simplifying implies:
fT + fR = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + 1
2σNt+1
Yt+1
Nt+1
],
which coincides with the product creation equation in the planner economy. Given that
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this policy does not affect firm pricing/profit rate, the distortionary effect of the profit rate
still exists (as in the corresponding flexible scenario). The three other inefficiency wedges are
as follows6:
ΣrigJC,t ≡ ΣJC,t
ΣrigJD,t ≡ ΣJD,t
ΣrigK,t ≡ ΣK,t
As in the case of a sales tax, all inefficiency wedges are present under this policy. Also, the
profit rate under this policy is the same as in the corresponding flexible scenario, given that
optimal pricing is also not affected under this perspective.
2.5.4 Numerical exercise
The effect of eliminating non-regulation related distortions in the rigid model on the inefficiency
wedges depends on model parameters. This section numerically evaluates the impact of the
policies discussed above under the rigid perspective in a calibrated model of the Euro Area
over the period 1995:Q1 to 2013:Q1. Model calibration follows CF. Periods are interpreted as
quarters. As is standard in the business cycle literature, the discount factor, β, is set to 0.99,
risk aversion, γ, to 1, the share parameter on capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function,
α, to 0.33, and the capital depreciation rate, δk, to 0.025. The exogenous separation rate, λ
x,
is chosen such that 71% of jobs which are destroyed in the previous year do not reappear in the
current year. The price-elasticity of spending share on an individual good, σ, is set such that
the markup, µ, is 10%. The implied elasticity of substitution is 11. The worker’s bargaining
power parameter, η, is set equal to the elasticity of matches to unemployment, ε, so that the
Hosios condition is satisfied.
The vacancy posting cost, κ, is set equal to 0.13, which corresponds to 13% of the average
wage. The average benefit replacement rate is set to 62%. Home production, hp, the matching
function, χ, and firing costs, F , are chosen by CF to match the total separation rate, λtot, the
unemployment rate, U , and the probability of filling a vacancy, q. This requires that hp and
χ are equal to 0.38 and 0.43, respectively. F is equal to 7% of the average wage. q is set to
6The dividend tax which eliminates the misalignment distortion has the same effect on inefficiency wedges,
given that pricing is also unaffected by this instrument. As in the flexible case, the tax rate which achieve this
is given by 1− τDt ∗ = ( 1
2σNt
)(
µt
µt − 1)
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0.6. The plant exit rate, δ is set such that 25% of the steady state gross job destruction rate
is due to firm exit. The regulation-related entry cost, fR is set such that the aggregate cost
of product market deregulation is 1.98% of GDP. The technological cost of entry, FT is set to
1.09% of GDP. The standard deviation of the technology shock, σZ , and the autoregressive
parameter, φZ , are set to 0.009 and 0.98, respectively. The lognormnal scale, µzi, and the
shape parameter, σzi, are set equal to zero and 0.15, respectively. The investment adjustment
cost, ν, is equal to 1.5. The model calibration is summarized in Table 2.2.
Table 2.3 shows the results of the policy experiment comparing the inefficiency wedges
which result under the four fiscal policies discussed under the rigid perspective. All policies
raise the steady state product creation wedge relative to the baseline rigid equilibrium. On the
other hand, the consumption output wedge is lower under all policies relative to the baseline
rigid equilibrium. Efficiency outcomes along the job creation and job destruction margins vary
by fiscal instrument. With marginal cost pricing and a sales subsidy, the steady state job
creation inefficiency wedges are lower. The job destruction inefficiency wedge is lower only
with marginal cost pricing. Capital accumulation is also efficient under marginal cost pricing
as established previously.
The results show that, in the presence of regulation, marginal cost pricing does not lower
all inefficiency wedges relative to the baseline rigid economy. In contrast to under the flexi-
ble perspective, marginal cost pricing is no longer a dominant policy given that it raises the
product creation wedge, as in the case of the other policies. The results show that eliminat-
ing non-regulation related distortions in the rigid economy equilibrium cannot raise overall
efficiency when regulation is present in the economy. There will be trade-offs associated with
implementing the fiscal policies discussed.
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Table 2.2: Calibration
Parameter Value
Variety elasticity, σ 3.12
Risk aversion, γ 1
Discount factor, β 0.99
Technological entry cost, fT 1.67
Regulation entry cost, fR 1.77
Plant exit, δ 0.009
Investment adjustment cost, ν 1.5
Capital depreciation rate, δK 0.025
Capital share, α 0.33
Exogenous separation rate, λx 0.025
Matching function elasticity, ε 0.6
Workers’ bargaining power, η 0.6
Home Production, hp 0.38
Unemployment benefit, b, 1.06
Matching efficiency, χ 0.43
Vacancy cost, κ 0.13
Lognormal shape, σzi 0.147
TFP, persistence φZ 0.983
Firing costs, F 0.11
TFP, standard deviation σZ 0.009
Table 2.3: Inefficiency wedges and fiscal policy
Wedge No policy MC pricing Sales subsidy Entry subsidy Dividend tax
ΣrigPC,t 0.003 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
ΣrigJC,t 0.670 0.429 0.665 0.992 0.999
ΣrigJD,t 2.183 2.035 2.326 2.850 2.8663
ΣrigK,t 0.004 0 0.003 0.005 0.005
ΣrigY,t 0.051 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.037
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the effect of a range of fiscal policies on the distortions in the CF
framework. This model embeds labour market frictions, endogenous job creation and job
destruction into the BGM model which features endogenous firm entry. This was done under
two perspectives - the flexible and rigid perspectives, respectively. The difference between
the two perspectives is in the presence of regulation-related distortions in the decentralized
economy. Under the flexible perspective, there are no distortions from regulation. There are
two non-regulation related distortions. Under the rigid perspective, there are an additional
three regulation-related distortions.
Under the flexible perspective, I consider the effect of fiscal policy instruments which
Bilbiie et al. (2008) show can restore efficiency in the BGM framework on inefficiency in the
CF framework. Both models feature a misalignment distortion which leads to inefficient firm
entry. However, in the CF framework, the other distortion comes from the effect of monopoly
power along the job creation, job destruction and capital accumulation margins. This is in
contrast to the BGM framework where the other distortion is due to the non-synchronization
of markups across time which also creates inefficiency in firm entry. This means that in the
CF model the distortion created by monopoly power must be eliminated in order to restore
efficiency in the market economy, in contrast to BGM.
Because firm’s monopoly power does not create a distortion in BGM, marginal cost pricing
is not required in order to restore efficiency. In contrast, this policy is necessary in order to
restore efficiency in the flexible CF model. As in Bilbiie et al. (2008), I find that marginal
cost pricing, implemented via a sales subsidy which ensures an equal split between households
and firms in financing the subsidy, eliminates both distortions in the CF framework. Bilbiie
et al. (2008) also show that this policy also eliminates the distortion created by the non-
synchronization of markups. Therefore, this policy is optimal in both settings.
The product creation wedge is the only wedge which can possibly be eliminated by BGM-
optimal fiscal policies, with the exception of marginal cost pricing. Under the flexible perspec-
tive, the distortionary effect of monopoly power will remain in job creation, job destruction
and capital accumulation with all other instruments. This is because these instruments either
do not affect firm pricing, in the case of a dividend tax and an entry subsidy, respectively, or
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are unable to eliminate the distortionary effect of firm’s monopoly power, in the case of a sales
subsidy.
Results from the calibrated model show that the effect of the fiscal policies on the job
creation and job destruction inefficiency wedges under the rigid perspective varies by instru-
ment. The steady state job destruction inefficiency wedge falls in the case of marginal cost
pricing only. The job creation wedge is lower with marginal cost pricing and a sales subsidy,
respectively. In contrast to under the flexible perspective, marginal cost pricing under the
rigid perspective does not lower/eliminate all inefficiency wedges. The results for the cali-
brated model show that when regulation is present in the economy, eliminating non-regulation
distortions cannot raise overall efficiency.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal policy shocks: Endogenous
entry and labour market frictions
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the implications of fiscal shocks in the context of a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with endogenous producer entry, labour market frictions
and regulation in the goods and labour markets, developed by Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), here
after CF. Studies have shown that entry dynamics matter for the propagation of technology
and fiscal shocks. In this chapter, realistic aspects of fiscal policy are incorporated into the CF
framework to investigate the extent to which the presence of labour market frictions matter for
aggregate outcomes following fiscal shocks. This allows us to shed some light on the mechanisms
which determine the aggregate effects of these shocks.
It also examine whether the mechanisms by which macroeconomic variables are affected
may differ depending on the type of fiscal shock faced. Three fiscal policy shocks are considered,
namely: i) a shock to government consumption; ii) a capital income tax shock; iii) a labour
income tax shock. Finally, it investigates whether the effects of fiscal shocks depend on the
level of market regulation. CF find that relative to an economy with high regulation, when
overall market regulation is low, macroeconomic variables such as, consumption, investment
and GDP show a less pronounced decline from steady state following a negative technology
shock.
Bilbiie et al. (2012), hereafter, BGM show that endogenous firm entry and product cre-
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ation have important implications for business cycle dynamics. Chugh and Ghironi (2011)
incorporate fiscal policy into the BGM model and show that entry dynamics also matter for
the aggregate effects of a positive labour income tax shock. The authors argue that, following
the shock, output falls due to a decline in product creation.
However, little is known about the implications of labour market frictions, with endogenous
job creation and job destruction, for the propagation of fiscal shocks. There is a vast theoretical
literature on the effects of government spending shocks. This includes, Baxter and King
(1993), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Linnemann and Schabert (2003), among others. Some studies
argue that private consumption reacts negatively to an expansion in government spending
financed by lump sum taxation of households due to the negative wealth effect of higher future
taxes. Others have shown, however, that with GHH preferences and rule-of-thumb consumers,
respectively, it is possible to generate a positive response of consumption to an expansion in
government spending.
Empirical studies based on vector autoregressions also make contrasting findings. Some
studies, including Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2000), and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) find that government spending raises consumption. Others, such as, Ramey
(2011) and Edelberg et al. (1999) find a negative effect on consumption. The empirical evidence
on capital investment is also mixed. The widely accepted view that government spending and
output are positively correlated has also been contested. For example, Linnemann and Schabert
(2003) argue that an expansion in government spending leads to a fall in output. In addition,
Alesina et al. (2018) find that fiscal austerity can be expansionary.
Studies examining the effects of government spending shocks generally assume that house-
holds face a labour supply decision and so in response to changes in government spending,
the household can adjust its labour supply. In contrast, in the standard search and matching
framework, the labor supply choice is not explicit, as employment is an outcome of a labour
market matching process. The presence of endogenous producer entry may also have impli-
cations for the effect of a government spending shock. As explained by Lewis and Winkler
(2017), the response of consumption to a positive government spending shock depends on the
response of firm entry. An increase in the number of firms entering the market could stimulate
consumption through increased labour demand. This makes the response of aggregate variables
to an expansion in government consumption a priori ambiguous in the CF framework.
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I find that private consumption reacts negatively following a positive shock to government
spending which is financed by lump sum taxes, as in Chugh and Ghironi (2011), and consistent
with standard RBC theory. An expansion in government spending also leads to a decline in
investment in capital and new products, respectively. The results show that a rise in govern-
ment spending can lead to a persistent decline in wages due to entry and capital investment
dynamics. In addition, the positive fiscal shocks considered have recessionary effects due to
the dynamics of entry, investment and labour market conditions. Results also show that, fol-
lowing fiscal shocks, unemployment volatility is greater when regulation is high. The chapter
is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model which introduces fiscal policy into the
CF framework. Section 3.3 describes the calibration. Section 3.4 presents the results. Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The general model framework follows Chapter 2 with a few exceptions detailed below. House-
hold preferences and production follow sections 2.1 and 2.2 of Chapter 2, respectively, with
important exceptions detailed below. In the model presented in this chapter, in addition to
lump sum taxes, the government also has access to distortionary taxes to finance its spending.
3.2.1 Wage setting
Workers and firms bargain over the match surplus. The exogenous bargaining weight η ∈ (0, 1)
determines the workers’ bargaining power. Labour income is taxed at a rate τnt which means
that the surplus-splitting rule is given by:
∆˜Wωt = (1− τnt )
η
1− η ∆˜
F
ωt
τnt creates a wedge in the Nash sharing rule such that the worker receives a smaller share
of the surplus net-of-taxes than would have occured absent the tax (see, for instance, Arseneau
and Chugh (2006)). The derivation of the wage equation is contained in the Appendix. The
wage paid to each worker is given by:
wωt(z) = η(Πωt(z) +
κ
qt
+ F ) +
1− η
1− τnt
$t −
η(1− τnt+1)
1− τnt
(
κ
qt
+ Etβ˜t,t+1F ) (3.1)
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It is a function of the firm surplus excluding the wage payment to the worker (given by
the first term in brackets), the worker’s outside option, $t, the marginal benefit of posting a
vacancy,
κ
qt
, and next period’s firing costs, β˜t,t+1F . The workers’ outside option, $t, corre-
sponding to the value of unemployment is given by the following expression:
$t ≡ hp + ub+
∫ ∞
ω⊂Ωt
st
vωt
Vt
Et[β˜t,t−1(1−G(zcωt+1))∆˜Wωt+1]dω, (3.2)
where ub represents unemployment benefits from the government and hp is home production.
The third term in the expression represents the expected discounted value of searching for
other jobs.
The worker surplus is given by:
∆Wωt(z) = (1− τnt )wωt(z)−$t + Etβ˜t,t+1(1−G(zcωt+1))∆˜Wωt+1 (3.3)
The average worker surplus is given by the following expression:
∆˜Wωt ≡ [(1−G(zcωt))]−1
∫ ∞
zcωt
∆Wωt(z)dz (3.4)
3.2.2 Household budget constraint and first-stage budgeting
Households hold shares in a mutual fund of firms and own the economy’s stock of capital,
Kt. xt represents the share in the mutual fund held by the representative household entering
period t, and xt+1 the amount of shares in a mutual fund of firms consisting of incumbent firms
and new entrants (Nt +NEt) purchased by the representative household in t + 1. The date-t
price of a share in the mutual fund is equal to the price of claims to future firm real profits,
et. Physical capital, Kt obeys a standard law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + IKt[1− (ν/2)(IKt/IKt−1 − 1)2], (3.5)
where ν > 0 is a scale parameter. The per-period household’s budget constraint is given
by:
Ct+et(Nt+NEt)xt+1 +IKt = (dt+et)Ntxt+(1−τnt )w˜tLt+(1−τkt )rtKt+(hp+ub)(1−Lt)+Tt,
(3.6)
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where T are lump-sum taxes, τnt and τ
k
t are tax rates on labour income and capital income,
respectively. The household maximizes its expected intertemporal utility subject to the above
budget constraint and law of motion for physical capital. The Euler equation for share holdings
is given by: et = Et[βt,t+1(dt+1 + et+1)]; the Euler equation for capital accumulation requires
the following condition: ζKt = Etβt,t+1[(1− τkt+1)rt+1 + (1− δK)ζKt+1], where ζKt represents
the shadow value of capital in units of consumption. The first-order condition for investment,
IKt is given by:
1 = ζKt[1− ν
2
(
IKt
IKt−1
)2 − ν( IKt
IKt−1
− 1)( IKt
IKt−1
)] + νβt,t+1Et[ζKt+1(
IKt
IKt−1
− 1)( IKt
IKt−1
)2] (3.7)
3.2.3 Government
The government finances an exogenous stream of government expenses {Gt} ∞t=0 through labour
income taxes, capital income taxes, and lump sum taxes. 1 The period-t government budget
constraint is:
Gt = τ
k
t RtKt + τ
n
t wtNt + Tt (3.8)
3.2.4 Equilibrium
The elasticity of substitution across varieties in the symmetric equilibrium is given by: Θt =
1+σNt. Aggregate employment can be written as: Lt = NtLt. Aggregate vacancies is given by
the sum of vacancy postings by existing firms and new entrants: Vt = (Nt+NEt)vt+NEtlt/qt.
The law of motion of aggregate employment can be written as:
Lt = (1− δ)(1− λx)[1−G(zct )][Lt−1 + qt−1Vt−1] (3.9)
The aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as:
CMt + IKt +Gt +NEt(fR + fT ) = w˜tLt + rtKt +Ntdt (3.10)
1I follow Chugh and Ghironi (2011) in assuming that the government has access to lump sum taxes. This
enhances the comparability of results and defines a useful benchmark.
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where Ft denotes aggregate firing costs. The main model equations are summarized in Table
3.1. The model features 10 endogenous variables: Ct, ρt, Nt+1, Lt, Vt, Mt, z
c
t , Kt+1, IKt, ξKt.
In addition, the model features four exogenous variables, Zt, Gt, τ
N and τk.
3.3 Calibration
The decision rules are solved for numerically given the non-linear nature of the equilibrium
conditions. The model is calibrated following CF, where possible. The authors choose param-
eter values to match macroeconomic data for the Euro Area (EA) for the periods 1995Q1 to
2013Q1. Periods are interpreted as quarters. As is standard in the business cycle literature,
the discount factor β is set to 0.99, risk aversion, γ to 1, the share parameter on capital in the
Cobb-Douglas production function, α to 0.33, and the capital depreciation rate, δk, to 0.025.
The exogenous separation rate, λx, is chosen such that 71% of jobs which are destroyed in the
previous year do not reappear in the current year. The price-elasticity of spending share on an
individual good, σ, is set such that the markup is 10%. The implied elasticity of substitution
is 11. The model is calibrated so that the Hosios condition is satisfied, that is, the parameter
governing worker bargaining power is set equal to the elasticity of matches to unemployment,
η = ε.
The average benefit replacement rate is set to 62%. The cost of posting a vacancy is 13%
of the average wage. Home production hp, the matching function, χ, and firing costs, F , are
chosen by the authors to match total separation rate, λtot, the unemployment rate, U and the
probability of filling a vacancy, q. These are set to 0.38, 0.43, and 0.11 respectively. q is set
to 0.6. U is set to 0.09. The technological cost of entry, FT is set to match the producer level
cost of R & D expenditure of 65% in Cacciatore and Fiori (2016). The regulation entry cost,
fR, is set equal to 69% of output per worker at the producer level.
Government consumption, capital income tax and labour income tax obey the following
processes:
In Gt = (1 - ρg) In G¯ + ρg In Gt−1 + εg,t
τkt = (1− ρk)τk + ρkτkt−1 + εk,t
τnt = (1− ρn)τn + ρnτnt−1 + εn,t
The steady state labour income tax rate, τn, and capital income tax rate, τk, are fixed
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Table 3.1: Model Summary
Adjusted Discount Factor βt,t+1 = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
Firm-level job separation λt = λ
x + (1− λx)G(ztc)
Law of motion of aggregate employment (1− λt)(1− δ)(Lt−1 + q(θt−1)Vt−1)
Law of motion of physical capital Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + IKt[1− (ν/2)(IKt/IKt−1 − 1)2]
Aggregate Unemployment Ut = (1− Lt)
Average wage w˜ωt(z) = η(Π˜ωt(z) +
κ
qt
+ F ) +
1− η
1− τnt
$t −
η(1− τnt+1)
1− τnt
(
κ
qt
+ Etβ˜t,t+1F )
Vacancies by entrants vet = (lt + qtvt)/qt
Aggregate matching function Mt = χ(1− Lt)εVt−ε
Probability of filling a vacancy qt = Mt/Vt
Job finding probability st = Mt/Ut
Job creation κ
qt
= (1− δ)(1− λx)E
[
βt,t+1[(1−G(zcωt))(Π˜ωt+1 − w˜ωt+1 +
κ
qt+1
)−G(zcωt+1F ]
]
Job destruction Π(zcωt)− w(zcωt) +
κ
qt
= −F
Pricing ρt = µtϕt
Markup µt(Nt) = µt = 1 +
1
σNt
Variety effect ρt = e
−
N˜ −Nt
2σN˜Nt
Profits d = (1− 1
µt
)
Yt
Nt
+ ψtlt − κ(vt + lt
qt
)− [ G(zt
c)
1−G(ztc) ]
Free entry vt = fE,t, where fE,t = fR + fT + κv
e
t
Number of firms Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1)
Euler equation (shares) vt = (1− δ)Etβt,t+1(vt+1 + dt+1)
Euler equation (physical capital) ζKt = Etβt,t+1[(1− τkt+1)rt+1 + (1− δK)ζKt+1]
Aggregate Output Yt = C
M
t + IKt +Gt +NEt(fR + fT ) + κVt + Ft
Aggregate Accounting CMt + IKt +Gt +NEt(fR + fT ) = w˜tLt + rtKt +Ntdt
at 20% and 10%, respectively. The steady state level of government consumption, G¯, is set
to 22% of steady state GDP. The innovations εg,t, εk,t, and εn,t are distributed N(0, σ
2
εG
),
N(0, σ2
εK
), and N(0, σ2
εN
) respectively, and are independent. The persistence parameters are
set as follows: ρg and ρk are set equal to 0.97, ρn is set equal to 0.90. These values are in
the region of conventional values used in the literature. The standard deviation of innovations
are as follows: σG = 0.027, σK = 0.037, and σN = 0.037. Table 3.2 summarizes the model
calibration.
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Table 3.2: Calibration
Parameter Value
Variety elasticity, σ 3.13
Risk aversion, γ 1
Discount factor, β 0.989
Technological entry cost, fT 1.59
Regulation entry cost, fR 1.68
Plant exit, δ 0.009
Investment adjustment cost, ν 1.5
Capital depreciation rate, δK 0.025
Capital share, α 0.33
Exogenous separation rate, λx 0.025
Matching function elasticity, ε 0.6
Workers’ bargaining power, η 0.6
Home Production, hp 0.38
Matching efficiency, χ 0.43
Vacancy cost, κ 0.12
Lognormal shape, σzi 0.147
TFP, persistence, φZ 0.983
Firing costs, F 0.11
Government consumption, persistence, ρg 0.97
Capital income tax, persistence, ρk 0.97
Labour income tax, persistence, ρn 0.90
TFP, standard deviation, σZ 0.009
Government consumption shock, standard deviation, σG 0.027
Capital income tax shock, standard deviation, σK 0.037
Labour income tax shock, standard deviation, σN 0.037
53
3.4 Fiscal policy shocks and business cycle dynamics
I examine the effects of three fiscal policy shocks, namely, positive shocks to i) government
consumption; ii) the labour income tax rate; iii) the capital income tax rate. I also consider
the mechanisms at play following the fiscal shocks considered. In addition, I consider whether
the effects of fiscal shocks depend on the level of overall regulation in the economy.
For the low regulation economy, I follow the procedure outlined in CF to determine the
values for regulation policy parameters. Policy parameters are lowered to their corresponding
U.S. levels to determine the low regulation economy equilibrium. Product market regulation
in the U.S. economy corresponds to a loss of steady state firm output of 0.54 months, as
reported by Pissarides (2003). Firing costs are reduced to zero as in Veracierto (2008) and
unemployment benefits are set equal to 57% of the average wage.
As shown by CF, business cycle dynamics following a temporary negative technology shock
differs depending on the overall level of regulation in the economy. The authors argue that
a highly regulated economy faces more macroeconomic volatility than one with low regula-
tion following a technology shock. This suggests that the macroeconomic effect of exogenous
shocks may depend on the overall level of regulation in the economy. It is also likely that the
mechanisms by which macroeconomic variables are affected may differ depending on the kind
of shock faced.
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 show the impulse responses from positive shocks to government spending,
capital income, and labour income tax rates, respectively, under two different scenarios. The
solid blue lines show the impulse response when regulation is high. Under this scenario, all
three dimensions of regulation are at the Euro Area (EA) level. The dashed red lines show the
impulse responses in the low regulation U.S. economy.
Figure 3.1 shows the responses of the two economies to a positive shock to government
consumption. The average value of a match declines following the shock which increases firm-
level job destruction. In addition, vacancies decline on impact as a result of a fall in firm
entry. Ricardian equivalence dictates that households feel poorer following an expansion in
government spending. The results show that this causes a decline in investment in product
creation. As the return on shares rises, however, so does the entry of new firms as reflected
in rising investment in new products. The fall in vacancies and rise in total separations raises
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unemployment in both economies but by a greater extent in the EA.
Households also reduce investment in capital due to feeling poorer. In addition, the shadow
value of capital also falls which has a negative effect on capital investment. Labour market
tightness declines steadily in both economies over the horizon shown due to rising unemploy-
ment. Declining labour market tightness and marginal productivity of labour have a negative
effect on wages. The marginal productivity of labour declines due to a fall in capital accumu-
lation and a decline in new entrants. The fall in firm entry leads to a rise in markups which
reduces labour productivity.
The positive government consumption shock produces recessionary effects in both cases.
This stands in contrast to results from standard RBC theory. Under the standard RBC setup,
a rise in government consumption financed by lump sum taxes leads to a rise in GDP because
higher government spending generates a negative wealth effect which causes households to
increase their supply of labour and reduce consumption. In the search and matching framework,
however, households do not explicitly choose labour supply. The results show that the shock
increases job destruction and lowers vacancies which leads to a persistent rise in unemployment.
In addition, the fall in wages, as well as, capital and product investment also negatively affect
output.
Therefore, the contractions in household spending due to the crowding out effect of gov-
ernment spending on consumption and investment (which in turn negatively affects wages)
leads to GDP declining in all economies for the period shown. This crowding out effect affects
new product investment by the greatest extent on impact in terms of changes from the steady
state. In the economy with high regulation, for example, investment in new products falls
by approximately 5% on impact, compared with consumption and investment which fall by
approximately 0.58% and 0.2%, respectively.
Figure 3.2 shows the responses to the shock to the capital income tax rate. Although
capital investment has a similar response to Figure 3.1, consumption and investment in new
products behave differently across the two shocks. Figure 3.2 shows that consumption rises
before declining. This is due to a substitution effect. As in the standard RBC model, a higher
capital income tax rate causes a decline in capital investment as households substitute towards
consumption. The results show that households also substitute towards investment in new
products.
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Following the shock, investment in new products shows marginal deviation from its steady
state value in both economies. Over time, it rises, reaching its peak at about 6 periods
following the shock. Consumption falls as new product investment rises and investment in
capital recovers. Households redirect resources to financing the entry of new producers. As
following a government consumption shock, wages decline over the horizon shown following a
shock to the capital income tax rate due to a fall in the job finding probability, labour market
tightness and the marginal productivity of labour. The negative effect of the fall in investment
and wages on GDP outweighs the positive effect of higher product investment and consumption
leading to declining GDP over the horizon.
As in the case of a government spending shock, aggregate vacancies fall on impact following
a capital income tax shock. The unemployment rate also shows the same pattern of adjustment
as in Figure 3.1. However, the job productivity threshold rises by less compared with a
government spending shock so that the rise in the unemployment rate is relatively lower after
20 periods (comparing corresponding economies) following a shock to the capital income tax
rate. As in the case of a government consumption shock, the unemployment rate rises by a
greater extent in the EA economy.
Figure 3.3 shows the responses to the shock to the labour income tax rate. A rise in the
labour income tax rate leads to a decline in capital investment due to the negative effect it has
on the marginal productivity of capital. Across the two economies, the marginal productivity
of capital falls on impact before recovering after about 4 quarters following the shock. As
the marginal productivity of capital rises, so does the shadow value of capital. This leads
to a recovery in capital investment. Households initially increase new product investment as
consumption and capital investment fall. Households find it initially more profitable to finance
firm entry than to invest in capital. However, product investment falls following this initial
rise, due to declining share returns, before recovering as the returns start to rise as profits
increase.
In contrast to the other shocks, wages rise in both economies following a labour income
tax shock. This is partly due to the rise in the marginal productivity of labour. Following the
shock, labour market tightness falls. This lowers the cost of posting vacancies which causes
firms to destroy more jobs. As the cost of posting vacancies rises, the separation rate falls
which causes unemployment to decline. Again unemployment shows a greater rise in the EA
economy. The dynamics of wages depend on the labour income tax rate both in the current
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and in the next period because the tax rate enters into the surplus sharing rule. The wage
equation shows that, all else equal, a positive shock to the labour income tax rate in the current
period leads to a rise in wages. Following the shock, wages increase and the cost of posting
vacancies falls, which generates a rise in the endogenous separation rate, as the negative effect
of these changes on the value of a worker to the firm outweighs the positive effect of the rise
in the marginal productivity of labour.
In terms of variation in macroeconomic dynamics across economies, the most noticeable
difference occurs in the adjustment of the unemployment rate. The results show that compared
to an economy with low regulation, a highly regulated economy generates greater unemploy-
ment volatility following fiscal shocks. In addition, impulse responses show that the greatest
variation across regulation scenarios occurs following a labour income tax shock.
In summary, a positive shock to government spending crowds out consumption and in-
vestment in both capital and product creation because households feel poorer leading to a
contraction in spending. In the case of a capital income tax shock, there is a short run substi-
tution away from capital investment towards investment in new product creation. Following a
labour income tax shock, on the other hand, investment in capital falls in the short run due
to a decline in the marginal productivity of capital.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduced realistic aspects of fiscal policy into the CF framework to ex-
amine the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks in economies with low and high regulation,
respectively. The CF setup embeds labour market frictions with endogenous job creation and
destruction into a dynamic macroeconomic model with endogenous product creation. I con-
sider the propagation mechanisms following shocks to government consumption, the capital
income tax rate, and the labour income tax rate, respectively.
The results show that consumption and investment, in capital and new products, fall
on impact following a positive shock to government spending. This is consistent with the
standard RBC literature. Chugh and Ghironi (2011) also examine the effect of positive shocks
to government spending and the labour income tax rate. The authors investigate the effects
of these fiscal shocks in a model with endogenous product variety. In contrast to the results
presented in this chapter, the authors argue, consistent with standard RBC theory, that GDP
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses, Government consumption shock
Blue line: Rigid economy; Dashed red line: Flexible economy.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses, Capital income tax shock
Blue line: Rigid economy; Dashed red line: Flexible economy.
59
Figure 3.3: Impulse responses, Income tax shock
Blue line: Rigid economy; Dashed red line: Flexible economy.
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rises following a shock to government spending.
In standard RBC theory and in Chugh and Ghironi (2011), this is due to the negative
wealth effect which causes households to work more and consume less following an exogenous
rise in government spending. In the CF framework, however, the measure of workers in the
household is determined by a labour market matching process which means that the household
cannot directly adjust labour supply. In addition, endogenous job creation and job destruction
means that job flows are responsive to labour market conditions, which matter for aggregate
outcomes.
In addition, in contrast to the results presented in Chugh and Ghironi (2011), product
creation falls following an expansion in government spending. As explained by Lewis and
Winkler (2017), a strong wealth effect generates positive firm entry and a negative consumption
response following an expansion in government spending. The authors also argue that firm
entry falls under conditions which reduce the wealth effect including GHH preferences and rule-
of-thumb households. The finding in this chapter that entry falls following a positive shock
to government spending suggests that when labour supply is determined by a labour market
matching process, firm entry also reacts negatively to an expansion in government spending.
However, this result deserves further attention.
In the CF framework, a rise in government spending leads to a persistent decline in wages
due to entry and capital investment dynamics. In contrast to standard RBC theory, I find that
an expansion in government spending has recessionary effects. Positive shocks to the labour
and capital income tax rates, respectively, also have a persistently negative effect on output.
Following a shock to the capital income tax rate, investment declines and consumption rises
on impact. In addition, it has a positive effect on investment in new products. However, GDP
declines due to the fall in capital investment and wages. Following a labour income tax shock,
unemployment rises significantly in the short run due to a large increase in the wages. Similar
to the findings of CF following a negative productivity shock, results show that, following
fiscal shocks, unemployment volatility is higher when regulation is high compared with a low
regulation economy.
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Chapter 4
Optimized unemployment benefits
and market deregulation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the macroeconomic and welfare effects of deregulation under an opti-
mized unemployment benefit policy. It also investigates the extent to which the welfare effects
of deregulation and transitional adjustment depend on the path of unemployment benefits and
whether there is scope for welfare improvements.
It has been argued that the benefit level following deregulation affects job creation and job
destruction through the worker’s outside option (see, for instance, Cacciatore et al. (2016a)).
This is supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Feldstein and Poterba (1984)) which find that
wages are responsive to the benefit level through the worker’s outside option.
This indicates the assumption about the wage-setting mechanism is important when ex-
amining the effects of unemployment benefits. We adopt the real business cycle framework
developed by Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), hereafter, CF. This model incorporates labour mar-
ket frictions, with endogenous job creation and job destruction, a` la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), into the Bilbiie et al. (2012) framework, which features endogenous producer entry.
In addition, wage setting follows surplus splitting which makes wages responsive to benefits
through the worker’s outside option.
Studies have shown that the welfare and macroeconomic effects of market reforms depend
on the dimensions of regulation that are being lowered (e.g. Cacciatore et al. (2012), Caccia-
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tore and Fiori (2016)). For example, CF, find that a reduction in barriers to market entry
lowers short run welfare more significantly than a reduction in firing costs reflecting the more
pronounced short run decline in consumption that follows a reduction in entry barriers.
The authors investigate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of lowering sunk entry costs
and firing costs, respectively, in a calibrated model of the Euro Area. Following deregulation,
the authors assume that unemployment benefits are immediately changed to their long run
levels. In contrast, we examine the implications of optimizing unemployment benefits both in
the final equilibrium following deregulation and in transition, respectively. Following Blanchard
and Gali (2010), we introduce a disutility of labour term into the utility function to account
for the role of employment dynamics on the welfare effects of deregulation.
In order to investigate the relative importance of the transition phases and final equilibria,
respectively, for overall welfare following deregulation, we consider three scenarios under which
optimization can occur following reform. In the first scenario, unemployment benefits are
immediately changed to their optimized steady-state level following deregulation, similar to
CF (however, here the final equilibrium is optimized). In the second scenario, unemployment
benefits are optimized as the economy transitions to its new equilibrium, but not in the new
equilibrium itself. In the final scenario, unemployment benefits are optimized both in transition
and in the final steady state.
The key policy change we implement is the introduction of a novel unemployment benefit
rule into the framework. Welfare optimization in transition involves implementing an unem-
ployment benefit rule in which parameter values are chosen to maximize the overall welfare
effect of deregulation. We consider two variants of the benefit rule which determines the path of
unemployment benefits in transition. In the first variant of the rule, the unemployment benefit
level depends solely on the pre- and post-deregulation benefit levels. The second variant, on
the other hand, includes an additional term which responds to GDP growth. From this version
of the rule, we can examine the welfare implications of relating the benefit path to changes
in economic conditions. In addition, we can take a step towards answering the question of
whether unemployment benefits should vary following deregulation.
Our work is related to the literature exploring the macroeconomic effects of deregulation
in models with endogenous producer entry and labour market frictions, including, Cacciatore
et al. (2012), Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) and Cacciatore et al. (2016a). It is also related to the
63
literature on the macroeconomic theory of optimal unemployment insurance (UI). Studies in
this vein have investigated the optimal cyclical behaviour of unemployment benefits following
macroeconomic shocks in models which incorporate the effect of benefit policy on the labour
market and firm hiring decisions (e.g. Landais et al. (2010), Mitman and Rabinovich (2011)).
Kiley (2003), Andersen and Svarer (2011) and Sanchez (2008), among others, have also inves-
tigated whether UI policy should depend on economic conditions. We however depart from
work in this area in abstracting from endogenous search intensity and assuming constant job
search effort. This allows us to focus on firm behaviour as a key driving force for labour market
outcomes and the implications of this mechanism for aggregate outcomes. In addition, we do
not explore the insurance incentive trade-off which is often a main theme of the literature.
We find that, following product market deregulation, household consumption in the short
run (first 12 periods following deregulation) is largely unresponsive to the level of unemploy-
ment benefits. Consumption always falls significantly due to the diversion of resources towards
product creation. Unemployment benefit dynamics have a negligible effect on this process with
the result that consumption always falls sharply following product market deregulation. Our
results show that relating the benefit level to economic conditions improves the welfare effects
of deregulation, but only marginally. However, the short run welfare effects of lowering firing
costs become positive when the unemployment benefit path is optimized.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. Calibration of the
model is described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the results of deregulation with an op-
timized steady state. Section 4.5 and 4.6 discuss the results for the scenarios which implement
the optimized unemployment benefit rule. In section 4.5, optimization occurs in transition. In
section 4.6, both the path of unemployment benefits and its steady state level are optimized.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Model
The general model framework follows Chapter 2 with a few exceptions detailed below. Pro-
duction follows section 2.2 of Chapter 2, respectively, except for wage determination.
As previously mentioned, the household utility function assumes disutility from working.
In addition, depending on the scenario under consideration, unemployment benefits may either
be fixed following deregulation or may vary according to the benefit rule discussed below. This
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will have implications for the dynamics of wages which depend on that of unemployment
benefits.
4.2.1 Household preferences
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households, each composed of a [0,1]
continuum of members. The measure of workers who work within the household is not deter-
mined by the household but by a labour market matching process. We assume full consump-
tion insurance, so that consumption is the same for employed and unemployed members of the
household. Each unemployed worker produces an amount hp of home production. Following
Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), we assume that family members insure each other against
variation in labour income that result from changes in employment status so that there is no
expost-heterogeneity across individuals within the household. The representative household
maximizes the expected intertemporal utility function:
E [Σ]∞t=0 β
t(
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
L1+φt
1 + φ
), γ, χ > 0, φ ≥ 0 (4.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Ct represents the consumption of market and home
produced goods, and Lt is the measure of household members that are employed. Following
Blanchard and Gali (2010), we introduce a disutility of labour term into the household utility
function adopted in CF. This specification is consistent with business cycle models in the
literature as it allows for the direct parametrization of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply, φ. As explained by Blanchard and Gali (2010), the period utility function
can also be “micro-founded” as the sum of household members’ utilities by assuming that the
disutility from working for each member is given by χiφ.
The consumption of market goods, Ct
M consists of a variety of goods defined over a
continuum Ω. At any point in time, a subset of goods, Ωt ∈ Ω is available. The aggregator
Ct
M takes a translog form as proposed by Feenstra (2003). As a result, the elasticity of
substitution across varieties is a function of the number of goods available. Translog preferences
are represented by the unit expenditure function which is equal to the price index. The unit
expenditure function of a basket of goods Ct
M is given by:
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ln(Pt) =
1
2σ
(
1
Nt
− 1
N˜
)+
1
Nt
∫
ω∈Ωt
ln(pωt)dω+
σ
2Nt
∫
ω∈Ωt
∫
ω′∈Ωt
ln(pωt)(ln(pωt)−ln
(
pω′ t
)
)dωdω
′
,
(4.2)
where σ represents the price-elasticity of the spending share on an individual good, and Pt is
the welfare based price index. Nt is the measure of the set Ωt. Household consumption Ct is
given by Ct = Ct
M + (1− Lt)hp.
4.2.2 Wage setting
Wage setting follows Krause and Lubik (2007). Workers and firms bargain over the match
surplus (the sum of the gains to the worker from employment and to the firm employing the
worker). The exogenous bargaining weight η ∈ (0, 1) determines the workers’ bargaining power.
The average wage is a weighted average of the average marginal revenue of labour (plus a firing
cost term) and the worker’s outside option. It is given by:
w˜ωt = η[p˜iωt + [1− (1− δ)(1− λx)Etβt,t−1]F ] + (1− η)$t (4.3)
The worker’s outside option, corresponding to the value of unemployment, is given by the
following expression:
$t ≡ hp + ubt +
∫ ∞
ω⊂Ωt
st
vωt
Vt
Et[β˜t,t−1(1−G(zcωt+1))∆˜Wωt+1]dω, (4.4)
where ubt are lump-sum financed unemployment benefits from the government in units of the
consumption basket. The worker’s outside option also depends on home production, hp, and
the expected discounted value of searching for other jobs, the third term in the expression.
Under the scenarios where unemployment benefits are assumed to be constant following
deregulation, wages are a function of a constant ubt. However, when unemployment benefits
are allowed to vary over time, it does so according to a rule. The unemployment benefit rule
allows for a smooth transition in unemployment benefits between its initial and final steady
state values. We consider two variants of the rule, where the second variant nests the first, as
discussed further below. Time-varying ubt evolves according to the following rule:
ubt = (αubt) ∗ ubf + (1− αubt) ∗ ubi + φpln( gdpt
gdpt−1
) (4.5)
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where,
αubt = αubf − αP ∗ (αubf − αubt−1) (4.6)
αubt is a time varying coefficient determining the weight assigned to the initial (before
deregulation) and final (after deregulation) steady state levels of unemployment benefits. The
initial and final unemployment benefit steady state values are given by ubi and ubf , respectively.
αubt is initialized at αubi and αubf is its terminal value.
φp determines the direction and strength of the relationship between unemployment bene-
fits and GDP growth, all else equal. It determines whether the level of unemployment benefits
adjusts positively or negatively with changes in GDP in any given period and the degree of
responsiveness. In the first variant of the rule, φp is set equal to zero, such that the third term
in (4.5) disappears. This means that the sequence of unemployment benefits are determined
solely by the time varying parameter αubt and the steady state benefit levels. In the second
variant of the rule, the third term in included as a determinant of the evolution of unem-
ployment benefits. The choice of parameter values related to the rule follows an optimization
process discussed further below. gdpt and gdpt−1 are GDP at time t and t-1 respectively, which
appear in the second variant of the benefit rule.
αP is the parameter which determines the evolution of αubt from its initial to its final
steady state value. We restrict its value to lie between 0 and 1 so that αubt also lies within
this range. The closer αP is to 1, the longer it takes for αubt to reach its final steady state
value. The values of αP and φp are chosen such that the overall welfare effect of deregulation
is maximized.
The unemployment benefit rule also embeds the assumption about unemployment benefits
adopted by CF, where the benefit level is fixed at its final equilibrium value following deregu-
lation. If αP and φp are equal to zero, then αubt is equal to αubf and unemployment benefits
are equal to their their final steady state value ubf .
4.2.3 Equilibrium
The elasticity of substitution across varieties in the symmetric equilibrium is given by: Θt =
1+σNt. Aggregate employment can be written as: Lt = NtLt. Aggregate vacancies is given by
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the sum of vacancy postings by existing firms and new entrants: Vt = (Nt+NEt)vt+NEtlt/qt.
The law of motion of aggregate employment can be written as:
Lt = (1− δ)(1− λx)[1−G(zct )][Lt−1 + qt−1Vt−1] (4.7)
The aggregate resource constraint can be expressed as:
Yt = C
M
t + IKt +NEt(fR + fE) + κVt + Ft, (4.8)
where Ft denotes aggregate firing costs. The main model equations are summarized in Table
4.1. The model scenario with non-varying unemployment benefits features 10 endogenous
variables: Ct, ρt, Nt+1, Lt, Vt, Mt, z
c
t , Kt+1, IKt, ξKt. ubt is also an endogenous variable under
the scenarios of the model where benefits are optimized in transition. In the non-optimized
scenario, where unemployment benefits are determined following CF, ub is treated as a policy
variable along with barriers to market entry, fR and firing restrictions, F , respectively. This
is discussed further below. Aggregate productivity Zt is exogenously determined. In model
scenarios where the unemployment benefit rule (4.5) is in effect, αubt is also exogenously
determined.
4.3 Calibration
The decision rules which determine the present and future values of model variables are solved
for numerically given the non-linear nature of the equilibrium conditions. Periods are in-
terpreted as quarters. Parameter values are taken from CF, where appropriate. The authors
parameterize their model to match the Euro Area economy over the period 1995:Q1 to 2013:Q1.
As is standard in the business cycle literature, the discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, risk aver-
sion, γ to 1, the share parameter on capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function, α, to
0.33, and the capital depreciation rate, δk, to 0.025. The value for the preference weight for
leisure in the utility function, χ, is a new parameter introduced into the CF utility function.
χ and the exogenous separation rate, λx, are chosen to match the total separation rate, λtot,
of 0.036 and the unemployment rate of 0.095. The values for these variables are set to 0.878
and 0.025, respectively. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, φ, a feature of
the disutility of labour term in the utility function, is set to 1 following Blanchard and Gali
(2010).
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Table 4.1: Model Summary
Adjusted Discount Factor βt,t+1 = β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
Firm-level job separation λt = λ
x + (1− λx)G(ztc)
Law of motion of aggregate employment (1− λt)(1− δ)(Lt−1 + q(θt−1)Vt−1)
Aggregate Unemployment Ut = (1− Lt)
Vacancies by entrants vet = (lt + qtvt)/qt
Aggregate matching function Mt = χ(1− Lt)εVt−ε
Probability of filling a vacancy qt = Mt/Vt
Market tightness θt = Vt/Ut
Job finding probability st = Mt/Ut
Pricing ρt = µtϕt
Markup µt(Nt) = µt = 1 +
1
σNt
Variety effect ρt = e
−
N˜ −Nt
2σN˜Nt
Profits d = (1− 1
µt
)
Yt
Nt
+ ψtlt − κ(vt + lt
qt
)− [ G(zt
c)
1−G(ztc) ]
Free entry vt = fE,t, where fE,t = fR + fT + κv
e
t
Number of firms Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1)
Euler equation (shares) vt = (1− δ)Etβt,t+1(vt+1 + dt+1)
Aggregate Output Yt = C
M
t + IKt +NEt(fR + fT ) + κVt + Ft
Aggregate Accounting CMt + IKt +NEt(fR + fT ) = w˜tLt + rtKt +Ntdt
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The firm exit rate, δ, is set equal to 0.25. In calibrating the regulation-related entry cost,
fR, the authors convert the index for entry delay into months of lost output. Following this
procedure, the aggregate cost of entry is 1.98% of GDP. The technological entry cost, FT , is
calibrated such that the aggregate cost of this entry cost component is 1.87% of GDP. We set
the price-elasticity of spending share on an individual good, σ, such that the markup is 10%.
The implied elasticity of substitution is 11. The elasticity of matches to unemployment, ε, is set
to 0.6. The model is calibrated so that the Hosios condition is satisfied, that is, the parameter
governing worker bargaining power is set equal to the elasticity of matches to unemployment,
η = ε. Home production, hp, is set to 0.38 and the vacancy cost, κ, is set to 0.13. Firing costs,
F , are set to 0.11. These values are taken from CF. The probability of filling a vacancy, q, is
set to 0.6.
As is standard in the literature, the standard deviation of the technology shock, σZ , and
the autoregressive parameter, φZ , are set to 0.009 and 0.98, respectively. The remaining model
parameters are calibrated to match CF. The lognormnal scale, µzi, and the shape parameter,
σzi, are set equal to zero and 0.14, respectively. The investment adjustment cost, ν, is equal
to 1.5. αubi is set to 0, while αubf is set equal to 1 consistent with the final steady state value
of unemployment benefits, ubf , being reached. Table 4.2 summarizes the model calibration.
4.4 Market deregulation: transition dynamics and welfare
We examine the effects of a permanent decline in the sunk costs of market entry and firing
costs, respectively, to the levels that obtain in the U.S, under perfect foresight. As in CF,
transitional dynamics following reform are found using the Newton-Rhapson method, as de-
scribed in Laffargue (1990) 1. Product market regulation in the U.S. involves a loss of steady
state firm output of 0.54 months, as reported by Pissarides (2003). Following labour market
deregulation, firing costs are reduced to zero as in Veracierto (2008).
Before examining the impact of deregulation, we detail the different scenarios considered
with respect to the optimization of the final post-deregulation steady state and of unemploy-
ment benefits in transition, respectively. In the model, optimization of unemployment benefits
can occur along two dimensions. Firstly, it can occur in the final steady state, the new equi-
librium of the economy following deregulation. In this case, the unemployment rate in the
1We would like to thank the authors for making available the codes to execute this routine.
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Table 4.2: Calibration
Parameter Value
Variety elasticity, σ 3.13
Risk aversion, γ 1
Inverse Frisch φ 1
Discount factor, β 0.989
Technological entry cost, fT 1.67
Regulation entry cost, fR 1.77
Plant exit, δ 0.009
Investment adjustment cost, ν 1.5
Capital depreciation rate, δK 0.025
Capital share, α 0.33
Exogenous separation rate, λx 0.025
Matching function elasticity, ε 0.6
Workers’ bargaining power, η 0.6
Home Production, hp 0.38
Matching efficiency, χ 0.43
Vacancy cost, κ 0.13
Lognormal shape, σzi 0.147
TFP, persistence φZ 0.983
Firing costs, F 0.11
TFP, standard deviation σZ 0.009
chi, χ 0.88
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final equilibrium is chosen so as to maximize steady state welfare, given the constraints of the
model and the level of regulation parameters post-deregulation. We refer to the final steady
state level of unemployment benefits derived from this optimization process as the optimized
benefit level. Secondly, optimization can also occur during transition, as the economy adjusts
to its new post-deregulation steady state. This creates four scenarios of interest for which
transition dynamics and welfare can be considered: (i) optimization does not occur along ei-
ther dimension; (ii) optimization occurs in the final steady state only; (iii) optimization occurs
in transition only; (iv) optimization occurs along both dimensions, that is, both in the final
steady state and in transition.
Both the final steady state and the transition dynamics of unemployment benefits affect the
transitional adjustment of model variables following deregulation as will be further discussed
below. We examine two scenarios for the final steady state level of unemployment benefits
which depend on whether or not final steady state welfare is maximized. In (i), optimization
does not occur along any dimension. Unemployment benefits in transition are equal to their
final steady state level which is determined by a fixed benefit replacement rate of 62% a` la CF.
In (ii) and (iv), respectively, the post-deregulation benefit level is fixed at its optimized value.
Under (iii) and (iv), unemployment benefits are optimized in transition (in contrast to (i)
and (ii)). In the optimized transition scenario, unemployment benefits vary in transition in an
optimized way. This is achieved by calibrating the value of αP and φp (in the second variant
of the benefit rule) in (4.6) and (4.5), respectively, to maximize household welfare following
deregulation. Welfare is defined as the percentage increase in steady state consumption ∆
which would make the household indifferent between adopting a particular reform and not
adopting it, keeping the level of regulation at the initial steady state level.
4.4.1 Optimized steady state: transitional adjustment and welfare following
deregulation
In this section, we examine the transitional adjustment and welfare outcomes following dereg-
ulation associated with an optimized final steady state, and the corresponding benefit replace-
ment rates and unemployment benefit levels (scenario (ii) above). Following deregulation,
unemployment benefits in transition are fixed at their optimized final steady state level. How-
ever, as mentioned above, the final steady state is determined by choosing the steady state
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unemployment rate which maximizes welfare subject to the model constraints and the cor-
responding U.S. level of regulation. We compare transition dynamics and welfare under this
scenario with (i) where unemployment benefits are fixed in transition at their non-optimized
final steady state level.
Using the above methodology to determine the optimized steady state, we find that the
final steady state welfare maximizing benefit replacement rates following product and labour
market deregulation are 0.58 and 0.60, respectively. These values correspond to unemploy-
ment benefit levels of 1.071 and 1.041, respectively. The pre-deregulation benefit level and
replacement rate are 1.066 and 0.62, respectively. Both values of the replacement rate follow-
ing deregulation are below the initial steady state benefit replacement rate (which coincides
with the post-deregulation steady state in the non-optimized steady state). Therefore, final
steady state optimization prescribes a decline in the long run benefit replacement rates. In
the case of product market deregulation, there is a marginal rise in the unemployment benefit
level from its pre-deregulation value. In contrast, the decline in the replacement rate following
labour market deregulation implies a fall in the benefit level. These differences are due to
differences in the dynamics of the long run real wage. Following product market deregulation,
long run real wages rise which generate higher unemployment benefits in contrast to labour
market deregulation where there is a decline in real wages.
The optimized steady state scenarios discussed above share some similarity with the joint
deregulation exercise considered by CF which involved lowering all three dimensions of reg-
ulation simultaneously. The main difference here is that the replacement rate in the final
equilibrium is fixed at a level consistent with welfare maximization in the post-deregulation
steady state. In contrast, the replacement rate in the final equilibrium following joint deregu-
lation is not optimized in CF. In addition, here, we consider a reduction in two policy variables
to focus on the effects of the sequence of unemployment benefits on individual reforms. We
consider joint deregulation in the form of: 1) a reduction in sunk entry costs to its correspond-
ing U.S. level and the replacement rate to its optimized value of 58% in the final equilibrium;
2) a reduction in firing costs to its corresponding U.S. level and the replacement rate to its
optimized value of 60% in the final equilibrium. We examine transition dynamics following 1)
and 2), respectively. We compare this with the corresponding non-optimized scenario where
the replacement rate in the final equilibrium remains at 62%.
Figure 4.1 plots the dynamic adjustment following product market deregulation under
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the optimized steady state scenario (red dash-dotted line). It also shows transition dynamics
for the non-optimized CF scenario (solid blue line). Compared with the optimized steady
state scenario, unemployment benefits rise considerably higher in the non-optimized scenario
following deregulation (3.8% versus 0.5% from its pre-deregulation level). Differences in the
dynamic adjustment to market deregulation across the two scenarios are most noticeable in the
adjustment of labour market variables. Lower unemployment benefits generate lower wages
by lowering workers’ outside option following product market deregulation. Unemployment is
also lower because firms destroy fewer jobs.
CF examine the effects of market deregulation under the same assumptions adopted for the
non-optimized steady state scenario. The authors explain that slow job creation by new firms
and the destruction of unproductive matches by incumbent firms leads to a rise in unemploy-
ment in the short-run. The authors also find that there is a short run decline in consumption
and investment in physical capital by households due to the reallocation of resources to finance
the creation of new products.
We find a similar short run decline in the optimized steady state case. There is only a
marginal difference in the dynamics of consumption and investment, particularly in the short
run. This occurs because the return from product creation, and therefore entry dynamics,
are largely unaffected by the dynamics of labour market variables. This can be seen from the
similar adjustment patterns in product investment. Higher employment under the optimized
steady state scenario generates slightly greater marginal productivity of capital, and in turn
capital investment, relative to the non-optimized steady state scenario, for the period shown.
Wage income is also marginally higher under the optimized scenario. However, this has only
a negligible effect on household income, and therefore consumption. The results show that for
consumption, lower unemployment benefits matter more for dynamics in the medium to long
run, albeit, marginally. In contrast, it matters more significantly for GDP and unemployment
both in the short and long run.
By conducting policy experiments which involve a comparison across the three scenarios
mentioned: the joint deregulation (optimized steady state) case, the joint deregulation case
presented in CF, and the non-optimized steady state case, respectively, some noteworthy ob-
servations can be made. Firstly, a lower unemployment benefit level following product market
deregulation is associated with a lower unemployment rate and higher GDP, both in the short
and long run. We make similar findings for investment in physical capital. Capital investment
74
is positively related to the level of employment, both in the short and long run. Secondly,
the similarity in transition dynamics across the two scenarios for short run consumption and
investment in new products, on the other hand, show that the dynamics of these variables are
largely driven by changes in the competitive environment, and to a much lesser extent by the
benefit level or firing costs. In addition, higher wages from higher unemployment benefits are
associated with lower consumption levels because unemployment also rises, leading to a decline
in household income.
Table 4.3 shows the welfare gains/losses that ensue from product market deregulation
under the two scenarios. Although medium to long run (the 13th quarter onwards) welfare
is slightly higher under the optimized scenario, overall welfare is lower (1.34% versus 1.42%).
This is because the short run welfare loss is greater under the optimized scenario. The reason
for this is that, in the short run, the disutility from working outweighs the positive welfare
effect of the marginally higher consumption levels in the optimized scenario. This result implies
that short run consumption needs to be higher than it is under the optimized scenario, all else
equal, for overall welfare gains to materialize relative to the non-optimized steady state.
Figure 4.2 shows the impulse responses from labour market deregulation under the opti-
mized (red dash-dotted line) and non-optimized (solid blue line) scenarios. Under the non-
optimized scenario, unemployment benefits rise by 0.03%. It falls by 2.33% under the optimized
scenario. Investment in capital is much higher under the optimized steady state scenario, par-
ticularly in the long run. This can be explained by the higher marginal productivity of capital
under the optimized scenario owing to higher employment following deregulation. New product
investment also falls by a larger extent on impact relative to its steady state level in the opti-
mized model because the differential return between investing in capital and shares is higher
under the optimized scenario. However, by the third period, new product investment is higher
in the non-optimized case as the return on shares rises.
In contrast to Figure 4.1, consumption is noticeably higher in the optimized model com-
pared with the non-optimized model. There is an initial decline in consumption in the non-
optimized model. In contrast, consumption is positive following deregulation in the optimized
model. This is because a lower wage rate from lower unemployment benefits reduces the mea-
sure of jobs which are destroyed due to the fall in firing costs such that although there is an
initial rise in unemployment in the optimized model, unemployment rises by a lesser extent
than in the non-optimized model. The unemployment rate in the optimized steady state model
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is significantly lower both in the short and long run. There is only a short lived decline in GDP
in the optimized steady state model, which is much higher due to higher aggregate demand.
Following policy experiments similar to those carried out in case of product market dereg-
ulation, some important observations can also be made about how the benefit level affects
macroeconomic outcomes following labour market deregulation. Similar to findings following
product market deregulation, unemployment in the short and long run is decreasing in the
benefit level, which is also reflected in the adjustment of GDP. In addition, capital investment
is rising in the employment rate due to increasing returns from investment.
Welfare results are similar to findings following product market deregulation in that labour
market deregulation entails a short run welfare loss and overall welfare is lower under the
optimized scenario. However, the overall welfare effect of labour market deregulation is negative
under the optimized steady state scenario in contrast to the corresponding case under product
market deregulation. We find that short run welfare loses are greater under the optimized
steady state scenario compared with the non-optimized steady state (0.45% versus 0.013% loss,
respectively), although consumption is higher throughout in the optimized model. Short run
employment rises too rapidly relative to consumption in the optimized model which generates
a short run welfare loss.
Only in the medium to long run does the welfare gain from consumption outweigh the
loss from employment. Medium to long run welfare is greater in the optimized steady state
model (0.33% versus 0.06%). However, overall welfare is lower because the medium to long
run welfare gain is outweighed by lower short run welfare. The results presented in this section
imply that higher short run consumption, lower short run employment, or both, all else equal,
are required for deregulation under the optimized scenario to generate better overall welfare
outcomes relative to the non-optimized scenario.
4.5 Optimized transition: transitional adjustment and welfare
following deregulation
In sections 4.5 and 4.6, we examine the macroeconomic effects of deregulation when the se-
quence of unemployment benefits in transition are determined by an optimized rule. We
consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, discussed in this section, unemployment benefits
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Figure 4.1: Impulse responses, sunk entry cost reduction
Solid blue line: Unemployment benefit level following product market deregulation not
optimized; Dash-dotted red line: Unemployment benefits following product market
deregulation fixed at optimized level.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses, firing cost reduction
Solid blue line: Unemployment benefit level following labour market deregulation not
optimized; Dash-dotted red line: Unemployment benefits following labour market
deregulation fixed at optimized level.
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are optimized in transition alone. That is, as in the non-optimized model, the final steady
state following deregulation is not optimized. In the second scenario, optimization occurs both
in transition and in the final steady state - this is discussed in the next section.
4.5.1 Product market deregulation
We find that overall welfare cannot be improved following product market deregulation by
allowing unemployment benefits to vary using the first variant of the rule. That is, under
the fist variant of the rule, welfare is optimized when unemployment benefits are fixed at the
(non-optimized) final steady state level following deregulation - αP equal to zero.
The blue line in Figure 4.3 shows transition dynamics following product market deregula-
tion for the non-optimized case which coincides with the optimized transition scenario under
the first variant of the benefit rule. The dash-dotted red line shows the impulse responses
following product market deregulation for αP equal to 0.95 in the first variant of the rule. We
compare transition dynamics under these two policies to more closely examine the mechanisms
behind the effect of the unemployment benefit sequence on aggregate dynamics and welfare
following product market deregulation. Figure 4.3 shows that a rising benefit sequence can
be associated with a declining unemployment rate. Endogenous job destruction is lower than
in the non-optimized scenario for the period shown (as in Figure 4.1) following deregulation
when αP is equal to 0.95 because wages are lower relative to the non-optimized steady state
for most of the periods shown.
As unemployment benefits rise, however, unemployment declines less steeply compared
with the optimized steady state scenario shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.3 suggests that an initial
large rise in unemployment benefits following deregulation leads to a large rise in unemployment
via its effect on wages compared with when that rise is gradual. Figures 4.1 and 4.3 show that
the magnitude of the rise in unemployment benefits following deregulation matters for the
dynamics of unemployment both in the short and long run. Figure 4.3 also confirms that the
path of unemployment benefits in the short run has a very negligible effect on the dynamics
of short run consumption. In the long run however, a lower unemployment benefit level is
associated with higher consumption. Comparing the optimized scenario shown in Figure 4.1
with the rising unemployment benefit scenario shown in Figure 4.3, we find that the lower
medium to long run unemployment benefits are, the higher consumption is over this period due
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to the positive effect of higher employment over this period on household income. However, for
the sequences of unemployment benefits considered, consumption varies only marginally across
scenarios. This is because the difference in the adjustment of household income is marginal.
In addition, the adjustment of new product investment is also largely similar across scenarios
such that the amount of resources being diverted to product creation is almost identical in
both cases.
We find that the short run welfare loss is increasing in the value of αP where as the
medium to long run welfare gain is increasing. Short run welfare loss is rising because the
average unemployment rate is lower the higher is αP as this prescribes a greater weight on
the (lower) final steady unemployment benefit level. In addition, short run consumption does
not increase sufficiently to increase short run welfare. When αP is equal to 0.95, the short run
welfare loss from deregulation is 3.05% compared with 2.68% in the non-optimized scenario.
The medium to long run welfare gain when αP is 0.95, on the other hand, is 4.45%. In the
non-optimized scenario, this value is 4.11%. Because the short run welfare losses outweigh the
medium to long run welfare gains when αP is greater than zero, overall welfare is lower.
The next part of the analysis incorporates the last term in the unemployment benefit rule
(4.5), i.e., the second variant of the rule. We determine the values for αP and φp for which
overall welfare is optimized. As under the first variant of the rule, the optimized value of αP
is found to be zero. The optimized value of φp, the parameter governing the cyclicality of
unemployment benefits, is equal to 117. These values mean that the optimized sequence of
unemployment benefits are related only to the final steady state benefit level (which is higher
than the initial value) and have a procyclical component. The impulse responses under the
second variant of the rule are shown in Figure 4.4 (solid green line). The dash-dotted red lines
show the impulse responses for the optimized transition/non-optimized steady state scenario.
First we discuss the effect of introducing the GDP term into the rule on transitional adjustment
before examining the welfare implications.
Incorporating the third term into the benefit rule generates a much larger rise in the
unemployment benefit level relative to the steady state following a reduction in sunk entry
costs. This occurs because the responsiveness of the unemployment benefit level to GDP
growth is fairly high - the value of φp implies that the third term in (4.5) is 117 times larger
than the log deviation of GDP. This is reflected in a higher unemployment rate on impact
compared with the non-optimized transition scenario. However as GDP declines, benefits
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also decline sharply before steadily recovering. The benefit level under the second variant
of the benefit rule rises above its value in the non-optimized scenario after 13 periods. The
unemployment rate also reacts contemporaneously, rising above its rate in the non-optimized
scenario in the same period. The higher medium to long run unemployment rate has a negative
effect on GDP which falls below that in the non-optimized scenario in the next period.
As shown in Table 4.3, including a GDP growth term into the benefit rule improves overall
welfare, albeit marginally. Household welfare is lower in the short run because the employment
rate is higher over this period, where as consumption is marginally lower relative to the non-
optimized scenario. In the medium to long run, however, household welfare is marginally higher
as the welfare loss from lower consumption is outweighed by the gain from lower employment
- which coincides with a higher consumption of leisure in the model. This leads to an overall
welfare gain relative to the non-optimized steady state scenario.
4.5.2 Labour market deregulation
As in the case of product market deregulation, unemployment benefit optimization following
labour market deregulation, prescribes an αP value of zero. That is, fixing the unemployment
benefit level in transition at the post-labour market deregulation unemployment benefit level,
which is only 0.02% higher than its pre-deregulation level. Because these values are very close
to each another, the adjustment of labour market and aggregate variables show a negligible
dependence on the dynamics of unemployment benefits. This is shown in Figure C.1 in the
appendix which corresponds to Figure 4.3 for the case of labour market deregulation.
Figure 4.5 shows the impulse responses with the second variant of the benefit rule. The
results shown are for αP equal to zero and a value of φp of 69. These are the values at which
overall welfare effect of a reduction in firing costs is maximized. As in the case of product
market deregulation, the second variant of the rule prescribes an unemployment benefit path
which is unrelated to the initial steady state value of unemployment benefits. In addition, the
rule prescribes a strongly procyclical component to the benefit level in each period.
The second variant of the optimized rule generates a decline in unemployment benefits
on impact, following the decline in GDP. It then rises above its final steady state value as
GDP recovers. Wages also fall on impact given the decline in unemployment benefits, and
therefore, workers’ outside option. The initial decline in unemployment benefits generates a
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Figure 4.3: Impulse responses, sunk entry cost reduction
Steady state not optimized. Red dash-dotted line: αP in first variant of unemployment
benefit rule equal to 0.95; Blue line: non-time varying unemployment benefit sequence as
prescribed by first variant of unemployment benefit rule.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses, sunk entry cost reduction
Steady state not optimized. Red dash-dotted line: Optimized transition (coincides with the
non-optimized steady state scenario); Green line: optimized unemployment benefit rule with
a GDP growth component.
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lower rise in the unemployment rate from steady state on impact. However, the employment
rate under the second variant of the rule remains below that in the non-optimized steady state
scenario thereafter for the time period shown, as does GDP. Consumption and investment
are also lower for the duration shown. Although unemployment is initially lower under the
second variant of the rule, this does not translate into higher consumption. This is because
wage income actually falls on impact because of the fall in wages. Higher income from share
holdings and dividends in the non-optimized steady state also lead to higher household income
which stimulates consumption.
The optimized parameters under the second variant of the rule generate higher overall wel-
fare. This comes from short run welfare gains outweighing the medium to long run welfare loss
relative to the non-optimized steady state scenario. The overall welfare gain from deregulation
is 0.07% under the second variant of the rule, whereas in the non-optimized steady state, the
welfare gain is 0.05%.
4.6 Optimized transition and steady state: transitional adjust-
ment and welfare following deregulation
In the previous sections, optimization was considered along only one dimension, in the steady
state or in transition respectively. In the case of optimization in transition, we examined the
effect of implementing two variants of the unemployment benefit rule - with and without the
third term in (4.5). In this section, we examine the effects of deregulation when optimization
occurs along both dimensions, that is, both in transition and in the final equilibrium, under
both variants of the benefit rule. By this we are able to investigate the extent to which
optimization along both dimensions matters for welfare outcomes.
4.6.1 Product market deregulation
We find that welfare optimization along both dimensions following a reduction in sunk entry
costs occurs when unemployment benefits are fixed at their post-deregulation optimized steady
state value (αP equal to zero). As with the non-optimized post-deregulation steady state
following labour market deregulation, the unemployment benefit level in the optimized steady
state following product market deregulation is close to its pre-deregulation level (approximately
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Figure 4.5: Impulse responses, firing cost reduction
Steady state not optimized. Red dash-dotted line: Optimized transition (coincides with the
non-optimized steady state scenario); Green line: optimized unemployment benefit rule with
a GDP growth component.
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0.5% higher). The two scenarios shown in Figure C.2 in the appendix (for αP equal to zero
and 0.95 respectively) show that the dynamics of unemployment benefits have a minimal effect
on transitional adjustment following deregulation under these circumstances.
Figure 4.6 plots the impulse responses for the dual optimization scenario with the second
variant of the benefit rule (solid green line). This is compared with the optimization in steady
state alone scenario (red dash-dotted line), which coincides with optimization (in steady state
and transition) using the first variant of the benefit rule. Under the second variant of the rule,
the optimized values of αP and φP are 0 and 37, respectively. As in the previous cases, the
optimized rule prescribes a procyclical component to unemployment benefits. The effect of
this can be seen in the impulse responses. Unemployment benefits rise following deregulation
mirroring the rise in GDP.
The results show that unemployment benefits under the second variant of the rule are
always greater than in the optimized steady state alone scenario over the period shown. This
means that the dynamics of employment under the second variant of the rule makes a posi-
tive contribution to welfare differences relative to the optimized steady state scenario for the
duration of time shown. Welfare results in Table 4.3 show that welfare does not vary much
across the two scenarios. A higher medium to long run consumption level under the optimized
steady state scenario offsets most of the short run welfare gain under the second variant of the
rule such that overall welfare is only marginally higher. The short run welfare loss from dereg-
ulation is lower under the second variant of the rule. However, this welfare gain is reversed in
the medium to long run as consumption falls below the level under the optimized steady state
scenario.
4.6.2 Labour market deregulation
In contrast to optimization under the first variant of the rule in the previous scenarios, un-
employment benefit optimization prescribes that the transition of unemployment benefits is
related to both of its steady state values. Under the previous scenarios, allowing variation in
unemployment benefits following deregulation led to a trade-off between short and medium
to long run welfare which lowered welfare. Although such a trade-off also exists here, in con-
trast to the previous cases, welfare rises. We find that welfare is optimized for an αP value
of 0.98. Figure 4.7 shows the impulse responses (blue line). The impulse responses from the
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Table 4.3: Welfare and market deregulation
Non-optimized steady state and transition Entry cost Firing cost
∆SR -2.68% - 0.013%
∆LR 4.11% 0.06%
∆SR + ∆LR 1.42% 0.05%
Optimized steady state
∆SR -3.10% -0.45%
∆LR 4.44% 0.33%
∆SR + ∆LR 1.34% -0.12%
Optimized transition (no growth)
∆SR -2.68% - 0.013%
∆LR 4.11% 0.06%
∆SR + ∆LR 1.42% 0.05%
Optimized transition (with growth)
∆SR -2.89% 0.08%
∆LR 4.38% -0.01%
∆SR + ∆LR 1.49% 0.07%
Optimized transition and steady state (no growth)
∆SR -3.10% -0.05%
∆LR 4.44% -0.01%
∆SR + ∆LR 1.34% -0.07%
Optimized transition and steady state (with growth)
∆SR -3.01% 0.08%
∆LR 4.37% -0.1%
∆SR + ∆LR 1.36% -0.015%
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Figure 4.6: Impulse responses, sunk entry cost reduction
Red dash-dotted line: optimization occurs both in transition and in the final steady state
with the first variant of the optimized benefit rule - this coincides with the optimized steady
state scenario; Green line: optimization occurs both in transition and in the final steady
state. Unemployment benefits in transition determined by an optimized benefit rule with a
GDP growth component.
88
corresponding optimized steady state case (red dash-dotted line) are also plotted. The unem-
ployment rate under the dual optimization scenario lies above that of the optimized steady
state scenario following the shock. Greater job destruction under this scenario exacerbates the
negative effect of lower firing costs on employment.
As shown in Table 4.3, an optimized steady state, both without and with an optimized
transition in benefits (under the first variant of the rule), is associated with an overall welfare
loss from deregulation. This is a result of either welfare loss in the short run or in both periods.
Although deregulation is associated with welfare loss in both sub-periods under the first variant
of the benefit rule, it is still lower than in the optimized steady state scenario where welfare
loss is confined to the short run. Rising consumption in the medium to long run under the
optimized steady state scenario generates a welfare gain from deregulation in contrast to under
the first variant of the rule where consumption does not rise sufficiently enough from its initial
level to generate a welfare gain. However, the slower short run decline in the unemployment
rate with the benefit rule result in higher short run welfare under this scenario. Households
experience a welfare loss of 0.07% with the rule where as under the optimized steady state
scenario, welfare loss is 0.12%.
In Figure 4.8, we compare the impulse responses under the second variant of the optimized
unemployment benefit rule (solid green line) with the optimized steady state (red dash-dotted
line). Benefit optimization under the dual optimization scenario implies an αP value of 0.98 and
φP equal to 84. As in the previous cases, the optimized rule introduces a procyclical component.
GDP falls following a reduction in firing costs which leads to a decline in unemployment benefits
on impact. This is followed by a sharp rise as GDP rises in the following period. Unemployment
benefits under the second variant of the rule remain above its level under the optimized steady
state scenario thereafter, which causes a large and persistent divergence in the unemployment
rates for the time period shown. Consumption is also lower over the whole time period with
the second variant of the rule due to lower household income. Wage income falls by a larger
magnitude following deregulation under the second variant of the rule. The initial decline in
wage income from lower wages under the second variant of the rule has a negative effect on
household income. As wages rise above the wage level in the optimized steady state scenario,
the negative effect of higher unemployment on wage income means that wage income remains
higher under the optimized steady state scenario. In addition, as entry rises in the short run
under the optimized steady state scenario, so does dividend income which contributes towards
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higher household income.
As shown in Table 4.3, welfare loss is lower under the second variant of the rule compared
with the optimized steady state scenario. Under the former scenario, welfare loss from deregu-
lation occurs in the medium to long run in contrast to the latter scenario where the welfare loss
occurs in the short run. Both the short run gain from deregulation and the medium to long run
loss are very small, with the outcome that the welfare loss from deregulation is close to zero.
Under the optimized steady state scenario on the other hand, the short run welfare loss and
medium to long run welfare gain from deregulation are larger and farther apart numerically,
generating a larger welfare loss.
In Figure C.3 (Appendix) the red dash-dotted line shows the impulse response under the
first variant of the benefit rule. The green line shows the impulse response under the second
variant. Dynamics are largely similar to those in Figure 4.8. As in the case of product market
deregulation, welfare outcomes are better under the second variant of the rule relative to the
first.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the implications of optimized unemployment benefits following
deregulation for transition dynamics and welfare. The dimensions of deregulation considered
were a reduction in the sunk costs of market entry and a reduction in firing costs, respectively.
We considered four post-deregulation scenarios. Each scenario is associated with the presence
or absence of unemployment benefit optimization either in the final steady state and/or in
transition. Three of the four scenarios involve some form of welfare optimization, which is
where the novelty of our analyses lie.
When welfare optimization is absent, the final post-deregulation equilibrium is not con-
strained by welfare maximization. In addition, under this scenario, unemployment benefits
following deregulation are immediately changed to their long run level based on the pre-
deregulation benefit replacement rate. When welfare optimization occurs, it takes place either:
i) in the post-deregulation steady state; ii) in transition following deregulation; iii) in both the
post-deregulation steady state and in transition.
In i) and iii) unemployment benefits in the final steady state are determined by choosing
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Figure 4.7: Impulse responses, firing cost reduction
Red dash-dotted line: unemployment benefits following labour market deregulation optimized
in steady state but not in transition; Blue line: unemployment benefits following labour
market deregulation optimized in transition and in the final steady state.
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Figure 4.8: Impulse responses, firing cost reduction
Red dash-dotted line: optimization occurs both in transition and in the final steady state
with the first variant of the optimized benefit rule - this coincides with the optimized steady
state scenario; Green line: optimization occurs both in transition and in the final steady
state. Unemployment benefits in transition determined by an optimized benefit rule with a
GDP growth component.
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the unemployment level which maximizes final steady state welfare subject to the targeted
(U.S.) level of regulation. In ii) and iii), we also define an optimized unemployment benefit
rule which determines the evolution of unemployment benefits as the economy adjusts to its new
equilibrium following deregulation. We consider two variants of the rule. In the first variant,
the benefit sequence depends only on a weighted average of the pre and post-deregulation
benefit levels. In the second, which nests the first, the benefit rule is allowed to respond to
GDP growth.
We find that final steady state welfare maximization generates a lower benefit level than
in the non-optimized steady state scenario. However, the lower benefit level negatively af-
fects short run and overall welfare. This is because employment rises too sharply in the short
run relative to the increase in consumption associated with higher employment. We also find
that the dynamics of unemployment following deregulation are significantly affected by the
unemployment benefit sequence. The dynamics of unemployment in turn matter for capital
investment, particularly following labour market deregulation, where entry dynamics are sig-
nificantly more muted. We find that the short run adjustment of consumption and capital
investment are largely driven by the entry of new firms following product market deregulation
and show almost no response to the adjustment of unemployment benefits. Consumption and
capital investment always decline in the short run due to the redirection of resources towards
financing investment in new products. For this reason, the behaviour of consumption following
product market deregulation contributes to welfare loss, particularly in the short run.
Given our specification of the utility function which includes a disutility of labour term,
the adjustment of unemployment also has important implications for welfare outcomes. We
find that overall welfare is lower following both product and labour market deregulation re-
spectively when the new equilibrium alone is optimized compared with when this is not the
case. As suggested above, this occurs because higher short run welfare losses with an optimized
equilibrium outweigh the medium to long run welfare gains. In the case of product market
deregulation, the greater short run loss is the result of rising employment which is not com-
pensated for by sufficiently higher short run consumption. A similar result is found following
labour market deregulation. Although short run consumption is higher in this case, it does not
compensate for the more significant short run rise in employment which leads to lower short
run welfare.
When optimization occurs in transition alone (but not in the final steady state), welfare can
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only be improved relative to the non-optimized steady state scenario under the second variant
of the benefit rule. However, the welfare gain is minimal mostly because consumption under
the rule is lower following both product and labour market deregulation. Optimization along
both dimensions, under the second variant of the benefit rule, is associated with lower overall
welfare compared with the non-optimized scenario. In the case of product market deregulation,
this is due to the steeper decline in the unemployment rate associated with having an optimized
steady state under the dual optimization scenario which is not sufficiently compensated for by
higher consumption. Adding the GDP growth term to the benefit rule following a reduction
in firing costs turns short run welfare outcomes positive, on one hand, but generates medium
to long run welfare losses on the other which also lead to lower overall welfare relative to the
non-optimized steady state scenario.
We find that product market deregulation always leads to short run welfare losses irrespec-
tive of the dynamics of unemployment benefits due to the negative adjustment of consumption
in the short run. Following both product and labour market deregulation, respectively, overall
welfare is highest when optimization occurs in transition, under the second variant of the ben-
efit rule. However, the welfare gains are relatively small. The results suggest that the response
of labour market variables and product creation to deregulation make it difficult to improve
welfare outcomes relative to the status quo. However, the short run welfare effects of lowering
firing costs become positive when the unemployment benefit path is optimized. This could
reduce political aversion to its implementation.
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Chapter 5
The macroeconomic effects of
deregulation: Evidence from panel
VAR
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the macroeconomic effects of market deregulation using a panel vector
autoregression (VAR) model estimated for a sample of 21 OECD countries. I consider three
dimensions of regulation, namely, barriers to market entry, employment protection legislation
and the benefit replacement rate. The main focus of the chapter is on potential interactions
between regulation and reform. The first part of the analysis examines the macroeconomic
effects of market deregulation, with a focus on private consumption.
Secondly, I consider whether the level of labour market regulation (firing restrictions and
unemployment benefits, respectively) has implications for the macroeconomic effects of low-
ering regulation along another dimension. More specifically, I examine whether the macroe-
conomic effects of reducing regulatory impediments to product market competition and em-
ployment protection, respectively, varies with the long run level of the unemployment benefit
replacement rate. A similar exercise is performed with the long run level of employment protec-
tion. In contrast to the level of product market regulation, the level of the benefit replacement
rate and of employment protection in most OECD countries has been fairly stable over time
such that the average values of these regulatory variables across time for each country are
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largely representative of their values at any given point in time. This makes it possible to
categorize countries in a credible manner.
I find that product market deregulation and a reduction in the stringency of employment
protection, respectively, negatively affect consumption in the short run. In terms of interac-
tion effects, the results show that there is no statistically significant difference in the impact
of product market deregulation on consumption across high and low unemployment benefit
countries. In addition, I find that product market deregulation leads to a larger rise in un-
employment in the short run in a high replacement rate setting, as well as when employment
protection is high. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.2 reviews the
empirical literature. A review of theoretical work and the main hypotheses of the chapter are
presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the empirical methodology. Baseline results are
detailed in Section 5.5. Robustness results are presented in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Literature review
Empirical studies on the effect of market deregulation, particularly those examining interac-
tions between regulation policies, have largely focused on the effect of regulation/deregulation
on labour market variables. Fiori et al. (2012), for example, examine the effect of market
regulation on unemployment by estimating a panel fixed effects model using data on OECD
countries. The authors find that more stringent product market regulation lowers employment.
Similar results are found for labour market regulation. Griffith et al. (2007) find supporting
evidence for the effect of product market deregulation on unemployment.
Few studies, including, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Griffith and Harrison (2004), and
Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) have considered the effect of market deregulation on aggregate
outcomes.Griffith and Harrison (2004) in a panel of 12 European Union countries over the
1980s and 1990s find that labour market reform lowers the average level of economic rents and
is associated with higher employment and investment. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), using
panel regression methods, show that entry liberalization in the service sector has a statistically
significant positive effect on economy-wide total factor productivity growth.
Few studies, such as, Bassanini and Cingano (2017) and Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) have
also examined the short run effects of deregulation. Bassanini and Cingano (2019) find that
increasing competition and easing employment protection can entail sizeable short run em-
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ployment losses. Using a local projection method, the authors find that a decrease in the
stringency of entry barriers in network industries leads to a 0.66% reduction in employment.
The authors also find that lowering dismissal costs on regular contracts decreases employment.
Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) provide evidence which supports this finding. The authors examine
the macroeconomic effects of product and labour market deregulation using a panel VAR on a
sample of nineteen OECD countries for the period 1982-2005. The panel VAR in their baseline
specification includes three macroeconomic variables including real investment, unemployment
and real GDP, in addition to, an indicator for regulatory impediments, employment protection,
or gross benefit replacement rates, respectively.
The authors find that unemployment rises and GDP falls in the short run, following a
reduction in entry barriers and employment protection, respectively. Following both shocks,
GDP falls on impact before recovering after approximately three years. On the other hand,
there are no recessionary effects from a reduction in unemployment benefits. In terms of inter-
actions, Bassanini and Cingano (2019) find that product market deregulation has a statistically
significant negative effect on employment in the short run only in a group of countries with
low employment protection. Similarly, Fiori et al. (2012) find that the employment enhancing
effect of product market deregulation is larger when employment protection is high.
5.3 Hypotheses
As in the empirical literature, most theoretical work on the effects of deregulation have focused
on labour market outcomes. Ebell and Haefke (2003) in a two-period model find that product
market deregulation increases employment in the short run. This is supported by Fiori et al.
(2012). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in a similar model setup to both studies find positive
employment gains from deregulation in the long run. These studies assume that the number
of firms in the market is given in the short run. On the other hand, studies such as Cacciatore
et al. (2012), Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) and Cacciatore et al. (2016), examine the dynamic
adjustment of macroeconomic variables following deregulation in macroeconomic models which
allow for endogenous producer entry in the short run.
Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) find that a reduction in sunk entry costs and firing costs,
respectively, negatively affect market consumption in the short run. Following product market
reform, resources are diverted towards the creation of new goods which requires a contraction
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in consumption. Following both reforms, job destruction also rises which negatively affects
unemployment and GDP in the short run. In contrast to the other reforms, consumption rises
following a reduction in the benefit replacement rate which raises job creation.
Studies have also examined interactions between reform and regulation. Work in this area
suggests that the effect of deregulation along a particular dimension depends on the type of
reform and the regulatory variable under consideration. Ebell and Haefke (2003) examine the
effect of lowering product market regulation at high and low unemployment benefit replace-
ment rates in a dynamic matching model with monopolistic competition in the goods market.
The authors argue that the reduction in unemployment that occurs following product market
deregulation (a reduction in entry costs) is greater when the replacement rate is high. This
arises because at a higher replacement rate, labour market tightness is lower making unem-
ployment more responsive to a given differential in tightness brought about by a differential
in entry costs. Coe and Snower (1997) find complementarity effects between labour market
policies in that a restrictive labour market policy reduces the effectiveness of another in reduc-
ing unemployment. For example, the authors show that when the benefit replacement ratio is
high, a policy which reduces barriers to job creation can have almost no effect.
Based on predictions from their theoretical model, Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) argue that
a reduction in barriers to entry and firing restrictions, respectively, lowers consumption in
the short run, where as consumption reacts positively following a reduction in the benefit
replacement rate.
Findings from Chapter 4, which are based on the model developed by the authors, show
that following product market deregulation, the decline in consumption in the short run varies
marginally across different levels of unemployment benefits. The results also show that unem-
ployment dynamics vary with the benefit level following product and labour market deregu-
lation (a reduction in firing costs), respectively. Investment dynamics also vary considerably
across benefit levels following a reduction in firing costs.
5.4 Empirical methodology
I adopt a panel VAR approach to examine the macroeconomic effects of reform in a sample of
21 OECD countries. Four macroeconomic variables are included in the baseline panel VAR.
These include private consumption, the unemployment rate, real investment and real GDP. I
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augment the panel VAR estimated by Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) with a measure of private
consumption to empirically investigate the findings of their theoretical model with regards
to this variable. I also consider the effect of the level of individual labour market policies
on the macroeconomic effect of reform along another dimension. The standard deviation of
the labour market regulation indicators, presented in Table 5.1, show low variation for most
countries which allows for a credible categorization of countries into high and low groups by
the respective labour market indices, discussed further below. Following Cacciatore and Fiori
(2016), I impose a recursive ordering of the structural shocks based on the assumption that
the regulation variables are more exogenous in the panel VARs. A second-order VAR model
is specified as follows:
zit = Γ0 + Γ1zit−1 + Γ2zit−2 + ft + di + eit,
where zt is a five-variable vector of the four macroeconomic variables and a reform in-
dicator. di and ft are country and time fixed effects, respectively. et is the vector of error
terms.
5.4.1 Data
I include 21 OECD countries in the panel VAR, using data between the years 1982 and 2005.1
Data for most variables are taken from the OECD, with the exception of the measure of aggre-
gate private consumption which comes from the World Bank’s database of economic indicators.
The details of the data included in the VAR are described as follows. For private consumption,
I use the World Bank’s measure of households and non-profit institutions serving households
(NPISH) final consumption expenditure in constant 2010 prices. GDP and aggregate invest-
ment data are in constant 2010 prices. Data on the unemployment rate is from the OECD
annual labour force statistics. The unemployment rate used is the harmonized unemployment
rate which represents the unemployment rate (unemployed population as a percentage of the
working age population) for the 15-64 age range.
Three measures of regulation are considered. For product market regulation, I use the
OECD summary measure of regulatory impediments to product market competition in seven
1These include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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network sectors, including gas, electricity, telecoms, post, passenger air transport, ralways,
and road freight. Labour market regulation is considered along two dimensions. The first is
employment protection legislation. I use the OECD summary indicator for the stringency of
employment protection for indefinite contract workers, fixed-term contract workers, and all
contracts (an average of indefinite and fixed-term contracts). The value of the index varies
from 0, which represents extreme flexibility, to 6, representing extreme rigidity. The other
dimension of labour market regulation considered is the benefit replacement rate. I use the
average unemployment benefit replacement rate across two income situations, three family
situations, and three different unemployment durations.
5.5 Results
First, I report the results of the panel VAR estimated for the full sample with aggregate con-
sumption introduced as a macroeconomic variable in the panel VAR estimated by Cacciatore
and Fiori (2016). I then consider whether there are interaction effects between regulation and
reform.
5.5.1 Individual deregulation
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation reduction in the regulation
variables. Panel 1 reports the results folowing a shock to product market regulation (PMR).
Panels 2 and 3 show the results for shocks to employment protection legislation (EPL) and
unemployment benefits (UB), respectively. The continuous lines denote the median responses
to the reform shock. The dash-dotted lines represent 68% confidence bands.
The results are quantitatively similar to the empirical results of Cacciatore and Fiori
(2016), with a few exceptions. I find that following an EPL shock, there is a slight increase in
investment on impact before it declines. In contrast, the authors find that investment falls on
impact. However, both results are not statistically significant. Also, the response of investment
has a pronounced U shape in contrast to the results of the authors where the impulse response
function is largely upward sloping. In addition, following a UB shock, the response of GDP
has a more pronounced hump-shape in the medium run than found by the authors. However,
the results are still quantitatively very similar.
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Table 5.1: Mean of reform variables
Country PMR EPL UBARR
Australia 3.06 (0.99) 1.04 (0.13) 24.71 (1.69)
Austria 3.93 (0.95) 2.18 (0.09) 30.15 (2.19)
Belgium 4.18 (1.19) 2.78 (0.48) 41.11 (1.73)
Canada 2.86 (0.84) 0.75 (0.00) 17.41 (2.32)
Denmark 3.85 (1.54) 1.99 (0.46) 54.47 (4.95)
Finland 3.77 (1.18) 2.18 (0.13) 34.37 (3.48)
France 4.74 (1.07) 2.92 (0.13) 37.18 (2.94)
Germany 3.78 (1.46) 2.81 (0.46) 27.24 (1.47)
Greece 5.27 (0.63) 3.42 (0.27) 11.61 (3.66)
Ireland 4.57 (0.86) 0.95 (0.06) 31.07 (3.96)
Italy 4.82 (1.20) 3.09 (0.70) 15.61 (14.10)
Japan 3.67 (0.96) 1.75 (0.28) 9.77 (1.10)
Netherlands 3.92 (1.44) 2.55 (0.28) 51.50 (4.55)
New Zealand 3.14 (1.09) 1.01 (0.27) 29.47 (2.02)
Norway 3.83 (1.05) 2.77 (0.15) 38.89 (3.70)
Portugal 4.65 (1.12) 3.87 (0.24) 32.52 (10.29)
Spain 3.96 (1.15) 3.40 (0.43) 34.52 (3.00)
Sweden 3.49 (1.10) 2.85 (0.61) 26.82 (2.15)
Switzerland 3.86 (0.53) 1.14 (0.00) 27.41 (7.66)
United Kingdom 2.49 (1.32) 0.63 (0.06) 18.24 (1.81)
United States 2.29 (0.37) 0.21 (0.00) 12.89 (1.17)
standard deviations in brackets
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The finding that unemployment rises following product and labour market deregulation,
respectively, is supported by Bassanini and Cingano (2019), one of the very few studies exam-
ining short run outcomes. The results support model predictions from Cacciatore and Fiori
(2016) on the effect of deregulation on consumption. Following a reduction in product market
regulation, consumption falls in the short run before recovering and turning positive in the
medium run.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction of the model following a reduction in firing
costs, consumption also falls when employment protection legislation is relaxed. However, the
empirical results show that consumption falls by a greater extent and takes a much longer
time to recover. The authors show that consumption falls by approximately 0.07% from its
steady state level on impact. In contrast, the results of the panel VAR show a 2.5% decline in
consumption following a reduction in employment protection. I also find a similar adjustment
pattern in consumption to that found by the authors following a UB shock. Although there
is an initial decline in consumption, in contrast to the findings of the authors, consumption
shows an upward trajectory, a finding also made by the authors. The results of the baseline
panel VAR are confirmed by the robustness analysis presented in Figure 5.6.
5.5.2 Interactions
In this section, I examine the effect of the average level of the dimensions of labour market
regulation considered on the macroeconomic effect of deregulation along another dimension.
This allows for an examination of whether the macroeconomic effect of product market dereg-
ulation depends on the stringency of labour market policies. In addition, it is also possible to
investigate whether there are interaction effects between labour market policies. I categorise
countries into “low” and “high” labour market regulation for each of the two measures of
labour market regulation and estimate a panel VAR for each group. Low regulation countries
are those which fall below the average of the regulation index average across countries2. High
regulation countries are those which fall above the average.3 Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the
2Countries in the low benefit replacement rate category include Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. Low EPL countries include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Japan,
New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
3Countries in the high benefit replacement rate category include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain. High EPL countries include Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
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Figure 5.1: Panel VAR, impulse responses to regulation shocks
GDP, Investment and consumption are in percent from baseline; The unemployment rate is
in deviations from baseline. URATE : Unemployment rate; CONS : Consumption; INV :
Investment.
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results for a PMR shock and EPL shock, respectively, for low and high UB countries. Figures
5.4 and 5.5 show the results for a PMR shock and UB shock, respectively, in low and high
EPL countries.
5.5.2.1 Unemployment benefits and a PMR shock
Figure 5.2 plots the impulse responses to a PMR shock in countries with low average unem-
ployment benefits (panel A) and countries with high average unemployment benefits (panel B).
In low UB countries, a PMR shock leads to a peak rise in unemployment of approximately 0.5
percentage points from baseline. In high UB countries, unemployment has a peak response of
over 2 percentage points. In contrast to findings, Ebell and Haefke (2003) argue that product
market deregulation lowers unemployment more significantly when unemployment benefits are
high.
The adjustments of investment and GDP also differ between the two groups. In high UB
countries, investment has a greater decline from baseline following the shock and falls further
in the short run. In contrast to the high UB group, investment rises after an initial decline in
the low UB group.
Although results from chapter 4 show that investment outcomes in the short run are
marginally worse following product market deregulation in a higher unemployment benefit
regime, differences in adjustment across unemployment benefit levels are more considerable
relative to consumption. The results in this section provide tentative evidence of worse invest-
ment outcomes in the short run following product market deregulation when unemployment
benefits are high.
The results for GDP suggest that product market deregulation lowers output in the short
run more significantly in high UB countries, consistent with higher unemployment following
deregulation. However, the difference across the groups is not statistically significant. In
contrast to the adjustment of the other macroeconomic variables, the adjustment of consump-
tion in the short run shows little difference between the two group, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Similar results were also reported in Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.2: Panel VAR, impulse responses to a PMR shock in the low UB group (top panel)
and high UB group (bottom panel)
GDP, Investment and Consumption are in percent from baseline; The unemployment rate is
in deviations from baseline. URATE : Unemployment rate; CONS : Consumption; INV :
Investment.
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5.5.2.2 Unemployment benefits and an EPL shock
Figure 5.3 plots the results following an EPL shock. The confidence bands are relatively
wider compared with the results from product market deregulation, particularly for the un-
employment rate and GDP, which makes it more difficult to make inferences from the results.
Compared with a PMR shock, there is less of a difference in responses across the country
groups following an EPL shock. The most noticeable differences occur in the adjustment of
the unemployment rate and investment. Investment rises in the short run in the low UB
countries. In contrast, high UB countries experience a decline in investment in the short run.
Investment stays below 5 percent from baseline for approximately two years before it begins to
rise. Unemployment in the low UB group rises on impact following the shock before steadily
declining shortly after. In the high UB group, on the other hand, the unemployment rate has
a hump-shaped response and only starts to show a persistent decline after 5 years. However,
the difference across groups is not statistically significant.
5.5.2.3 Employment protection and a PMR shock
Figure 5.4 shows the responses following a reduction in PMR for countries in low and high EPL
groups, respectively. The results show that the responses to a PMR shock are largely similar
across EPL groups, with the dynamics of consumption being the the most homogeneous. The
unemployment rate has a higher peak response following a PMR shock in the high EPL group,
similar to the analysis by UB group. The results support findings presented in Bassanini and
Cingano (2019) which show that a PMR shock has a statistically significant negative effect on
employment in the short run when employment protection is low. However, a similar finding
is also made for the high EPL group of countries, in contrast to the findings of the authors.
The initial rise in the unemployment rate following deregulation is however not statistically
significant in the high EPL group.
Investment and GDP fall on impact in both groups. However, the decline in greater in
the high EPL group. The response of consumption is quantitatively similar across the two
groups, similar to findings in Figure 5.2. Similar to the subgroup analysis by unemployment
benefit level, there is also tentative evidence that investment outcomes in the short run are
worse following product market deregulation when EPL is high, relative to when it is low.
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Figure 5.3: Panel VAR, impulse responses to an EPL shock in the low UB group (top panel)
and high UB group (bottom panel)
GDP, Investment and Consumption are in percent from baseline; The unemployment rate is
in deviations from baseline. URATE : Unemployment rate; CONS : Consumption; INV :
Investment.
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Figure 5.4: Panel VAR, impulse responses to a PMR shock in the low EPL group (top panel)
and high EPL group (bottom panel)
GDP, Investment and Consumption are in percent from baseline; The unemployment rate is
in deviations from baseline. URATE : Unemployment rate; CONS : Consumption; INV :
Investment.
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Figure 5.5: Panel VAR, impulse responses to a UB shock in the low EPL group (top panel)
and high EPL group (bottom panel)
GDP, Investment and Consumption are in percent from baseline; The unemployment rate is
in deviations from baseline. URATE : Unemployment rate; CONS : Consumption; INV :
Investment.
5.5.2.4 Employment protection and a UB shock
Figure 5.5 shows the results for a reduction in the average benefit replacement rate across EPL
groups. In the low EPL group, the response of the unemployment rate in the short run has a
u-shape. The inverse obtains in the high UB group. This translates into unemployment rising
by approximately 0.2 percentage points at its peak 4 years after the shock in the high EPL
category. On the other hand, it reaches its lowest value at approximately 1.5% percentage
points lower than its baseline 3 years following the shock. However, the confidence bands are
wide and the difference is not statistically significant. There is also evidence that consumption
rises by a greater extent in the medium run following a UB shock in the low EPL group.
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5.6 Robustness: Individual deregulation
As a robustness check for the results presented in Figure 5.1, I include the other two policy
variables in the panel VAR along with the reform variable, in addition to the macroeconomic
variables. Under this specification, regulatory barriers to entry have a contemporaneous effect
on labour market regulation and shocks to employment protection have a contemporaneous
effect on the benefit replacement rate. However, the reverse does not hold in both cases. Figure
5.6 shows the results. I find that the effect of shocks to individual dimensions of regulation are
quantitatively similar when all dimensions of regulation are included in the panel VAR.
5.7 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter examined the macroeconomic effects of product and labour market deregulation
and interactions between reform and regulation. I find evidence which supports the finding
of Cacciatore and Fiori (2016) that a reduction in barriers to entry and firing restrictions,
respectively, negatively affect consumption in the short run. This finding is shown to be
robust to the inclusion of all regulatory variables in the panel VAR when estimating the effect
of a reduction in entry barriers and firing restrictions, respectively.
The finding from the panel VAR which shows that macroeconomic variables react nega-
tively in the short run following a reduction in entry barriers is in contrast to theoretical pre-
dictions in the literature which suggest that employment rises or unemployment falls following
product market deregulation. This can be explained by differences in the model assumptions.
These studies generally abstract from firm entry in the short run and some do not consider
endogenous job creation and job destruction within the framework.
As explained by Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), the entry of new firms into the market fol-
lowing a reduction in entry barriers requires the diversion of resources away from consumption
and investment into product creation. The results also show that a reduction in employment
protection legislation also has a negative effect on consumption in the short run. Lower firing
costs increase job creation and destruction. However, because job creation is sluggish, unem-
ployment rises and consumption falls in the short run. In contrast to predictions from the
theoretical model, the results show that a reduction in the benefit replacement rate lowers
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Figure 5.6: Panel VAR, impulse responses to regulation shocks
GDP, Investment and Consumption are in percent from baseline; The unemployment rate is
in deviations from baseline. UBARR: Benefit replacement rate; URATE : Unemployment
rate; CONS : Consumption; INV : Investment.
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consumption on impact before it recovers. However, this result is not statistically significant.
The results from the sub group analysis of the effect of a reduction in entry barriers in
countries with low and high benefit replacement rates, respectively, show that the response of
consumption in the short run is almost identical across groups. This is supported by findings
from Chapter 4 which show that the unemployment benefit level has a negligible effect on the
dynamics of consumption in the short run following product market deregulation. Similar find-
ings are made when countries are classified by the level of employment protection legislation.
There is also tentative evidence that a reduction in employment protection raises investment
in the short run in low unemployment benefit countries, whereas investment falls in countries
with a high average benefit level.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.0.1 Derivation of the product creation equation: marginal cost pricing
and the rigid perspective
The firm’s profit function including the firm’s share of lump sum taxes to finance the subsidy
is given by:
dt = (1 + τt)ρtyt − (1 + τt)ρtyt
µt
− θtτtρtyt + (1− α)ϕtyt − w˜tlt − κvt − G(z
c
ωt
(1−G(zcωt)
ltF
This can be expressed as:
dt = [1 + τt − (1 + τt)
µt
− θtτt]ρtyt + (1− α)ϕtyt − w˜tlt − κvt
This is equivalently:
dt = [1 + τt(1− θt)− (1 + τt)
µt
]ρtyt + (1− α)ϕtyt − w˜tlt − κvt − G(z
c
ωt
(1−G(zcωt)
ltF
The average value of a job to the firm, ψt = (1− α)ϕt yt
lt
− ω˜t + κ
qt
.
This implies that: (1− α)ϕtyt = [ψt + ω˜t − κ
qt
]lt
Using this expression in the above profit function:
dt = [1 + τt(1− θt)− (1 + τt)
µt
]ρtyt + ψtlt + ω˜tlt − κ
qt
lt − w˜tlt − κvt − G(z
c
ωt
(1−G(zcωt)
ltF
This simplifies to:
dt = [1 + τt(1− θt)− (1 + τt)
µt
]ρtyt + ψtlt − κ( lt
qt
+ vt)− G(z
c
ωt
(1−G(zcωt)
ltF
The equation which combines the Euler equation for product creation and the free entry
condition is given by:
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(fT + fR) + κ(
lt
qt
+ vt) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + κ( lt+1
qt+1
+ vt+1) + dt+1]
Inserting the profit function into this expression gives the following equation:
(fT + fR) + κ(
lt
qt
+ vt) − ΥE,t = (1 − δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + κ( lt+1
qt+1
+ vt+1) − κ( lt+1
qt+1
+
vt+1) + [1 + τt(1− θt)− (1 + τt)
µt
]ρtyt]
where ΥE,t ≡ (1− δ)Etβt,t+1ψt+1lt+1 − (1− δ)Etβt,t+1[ G(z
c
t )
(1−G(zct ))
]
As shown in CF, ΥE,t ≡ κ
qt
[lt + qtvt]
Therefore, the product creation equation becomes:
(fT + fR) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + [1 + τt(1− θt)− (1 + τt)
µt
]ρtyt]
Inserting the optimal value of τt, 1 + τt = µt, this equation simplifies to:
(fT + fR) = (1− δ)E [βt,t+1] [(fT + fR) + [1 + (1− θt)(µt − 1)]ρtyt]
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.0.1 Wage derivation with labour income tax
A labour income tax, τnt , enters into the surplus sharing rule:
∆˜Wωt = (1− τnt )
η
1− η ∆˜
F
ωt
The worker’s surplus is given by:
∆Wωt(z) = (1− τnt )wωt(z)−$t + Etβ˜t,t+1(1−G(zcωt+1))∆˜Wωt+1
Therefore,
∆Wωt(z) = (1− τnt )wωt(z)−$t + (1− τnt+1)
η
1− ηEtβ˜t,t+1(1−G(z
c
ωt+1))(J˜ωt+1(z) + F )
∆Wωt(z) can be re-written as:
∆Wωt(z) = (1− τnt )wωt(z)−$t + (1− τnt+1)
η
1− η [
κ
qt
(Etβ˜t,t+1F )]
∆Fωt(z) = Πωt(z) + wωt(z) +
κ
qt
+ F
Inserting the expression for ∆Wωt(z) and the expression for ∆
F
ωt(z) into the sharing rule, we
get:
η[Πωt(z)+wωt(z)+
κ
qt
+F ] =
1− η
1− τnt
[(1−τnt )wωt(z)−$t+(1−τnt+1)
η
1− η [
κ
qt
+Etβ˜t,t+1F ]]
ηwωt(z) + η[Πωt(z) +
κ
qt
+ F ] = (1− η)wωt − 1− η
1− τnt
$t +
η(1− τnt+1)
1− τnt
(
κ
qt
+ Etβ˜t,t+1F )
wωt(z) = η[Πωt(z) +
κ
qt
+ F ] +
1− η
1− τnt
$t −
η(1− τnt+1)
1− τnt
(
κ
qt
+ Etβ˜t,t+1F )
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B.0.2 Fiscal shocks and macroeconomic volatility
Table B.1: Fiscal shocks and macroeconomic volatility
Fiscal shock Standard deviation of variable
Government spending shock
GDP 0.0120
Consumption 0.0401
Investment 0.0355
Unemployment 0.0502
Markup 0.0017
Vacancies 0.0591
Job finding rate 0.0437
Job separation rate 0.0115
Capital income tax shock
GDP 0.0409
Consumption 0.0450
Investment 0.1590
Unemployment 0.1392
Markup 0.0035
Vacancies 0.1634
Job finding rate 0.1208
Job separation rate 0.0319
Labour income tax shock
GDP 0.0294
Consumption 0.0300
Investment 0.0562
Unemployment 0.3463
Markup 0.0018
Vacancies 0.4719
Job finding rate 0.3011
Job separation rate 0.1165
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B.0.3 Fiscal shocks: 100 periods
Figure B.1: Impulse responses, Government consumption shock
Blue line: Rigid economy; Solid red line: Low firing costs, high entry costs and benefit
replacement rate; Dashed red line: Flexible economy.
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Figure B.2: Impulse responses, Capital income tax shock
Blue line: Rigid economy; Solid red line: Low firing costs, high entry costs and benefit
replacement rate; Dashed red line: Flexible economy.
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Figure B.3: Impulse responses, Income tax shock
Blue line: Rigid economy; Solid red line: Low firing costs, high entry costs and benefit
replacement rate; Dashed red line: Flexible economy.
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Deregulation and welfare
The computation of the percentage increase 4 in steady state consumption which makes the
household indifferent between deregulating and not implementing a reform is given below:
log[Cn(1 +
4
100
)]
χ
2
l2Σ12t=1β
t−1 = Σ12t=1βt−1 logCt −
χ
2
l2
[log Cn + log [1 +
4
100
]− χ
2
l2]
1− β12
1− β = Σ
12
t=1β
t−1 logCt − χ
2
l2
(
1− β12
1− β )[logC
n − χ
2
l2] + (
1− β12
1− β )log(1 +
4
100
) = Σ12t=1β
t−1 logCt − χ
2
l2
[logCn − χ
2
l2] + log(1 +
4
100
) = (
1− β
1− β12 )Σ
12
t=1β
t−1 (logCt − χ
2
l2)
log(1 +
4
100
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1− β
1− β12 )Σ
12
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t−1(logCt − χ
2
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C.2 Impulse responses from deregulation
Figure C.1: Impulse responses, firing cost reduction
Steady state not optimized. Red dash-dotted line: αP in first variant of unemployment benefit
rule equal to 0.95; Blue line: non-time varying unemployment benefit sequence as prescribed
by first variant of unemployment benefit rule.
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Figure C.2: Impulse responses, sunk entry cost reduction
Steady state optimized. Red dash-dotted line: unemployment benefits following product market
deregulation optimized in steady state but not in transition; Blue line: αP in first variant of
unemployment benefit rule equal to 0.95.
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Figure C.3: Impulse responses, firing cost reduction
Optimization occurs both in transition and in steady state, with and without a GDP growth
component in benefit rule, and in final steady state, respectively. Red dash-dotted line: unem-
ployment benefit rule without a GDP growth component; Green line: unemployment benefit
rule with a GDP growth component.
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Appendix D
Appendices to Chapter 5
D.1 Product market regulation in OECD countries: 1982 -
2005
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Figure D.1: Product market regulation in OECD countries: 1982 - 2005
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D.2 Employment protection legislation in OECD countries: 1982
- 2005
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Figure D.2: Employment protection legislation in OECD countries: 1982 - 2005
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D.3 Benefit replacement rates in OECD countries: 1982 - 2005
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Figure D.3: Benefit replacement rates in OECD countries: 1982 - 2005
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Abbreviations
Cons. Consumption
EPL Employment protection legislation
Inv. Investment
JD Job destruction
MPK Marginal productivity of capital
MPL Marginal productivity of labour
PMR Product market regulation
RBC Real business cycle
RR Benefit replacement rate
UB Unemployment benefits
UB-ARR Average unemployment benefit replacement rate
Unemp. value Value of unemployment
UI Unemployment Insurance
UR Unemployment rate
VAR Vector autoregression
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